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3.7
CVE-2026-90588: Zephyr HTTP client can read past buffer when debug logging
CVE-2026-90588 · published 12 days ago
Summary
The Zephyr HTTP client’s debug function may read data beyond the end of the incoming network buffer, because it treats header text as a null‑terminated string when it is not. An attacker who controls the server response can cause this extra read, which could lead to a crash or exposure of nearby memory. Turn off debug logging for the HTTP client or apply the available update to stop the unsafe read.
What to do
- Update zephyrproject zephyr to version 4.3.2 or later.
Affected software
| Ecosystem | Vendor | Product | Affected versions |
|---|---|---|---|
| – | zephyrproject | zephyr | < 4.3.2 |
| Ubuntu:16.04:LTS | canonical | zephyr | All versions |
Original advisory text
Out-of-bounds read in Zephyr HTTP client debug logging of response header fields
The HTTP client's debug helper print_header_field() in subsys/net/lib/http/http_client.c formatted an http_parser data-callback slice with a %s conversion: snprintk(output, len + 1, "%s", str). The parser hands its callbacks a pointer and a length into the caller's receive buffer, and those bytes are not NUL terminated. The size argument of snprintk() bounds only the destination, while the %s conversion measures the source first — lib/os/cbprintf_complete.c uses strlen() when no precision is given, and lib/os/cbprintf_nano.c uses strlen() unconditionally — so the read walks past the end of the header field and past the end of the receive buffer until it finds a zero byte.
The slice reaches the helper from on_url(), on_header_field() and on_header_value(), which the parser invokes on bytes that http_wait_data() read straight off the socket into the application-supplied recv_buf. A malicious or compromised HTTP server, or an attacker able to answer a plaintext request, therefore controls both the header field and the bytes that follow it in the buffer, and can guarantee that no zero byte appears before the buffer ends, forcing the over-read. The in-tree tests/net/lib/http_client suite reproduces the over-read under CONFIG_ASAN=y on an ordinary GET.
The impact is bounded. The whole helper body is compiled only when the HTTP client log module is explicitly set to Debug (CONFIG_NET_HTTP_LOG_LEVEL_DBG=y, which the global CONFIG_LOG_DEFAULT_LEVEL does not set), so default builds are unaffected. No out-of-bounds write occurs and none of the over-read bytes are emitted into the log, so there is no information disclosure; the consequence is an out-of-bounds read that can fault and panic the device where the buffer abuts an unmapped or MPU/MMU-protected region.
The fix copies exactly the len bytes the parser offered with memcpy() and terminates them, instead of relying on a %s conversion (a %.*s precision would not have sufficed, since cbprintf_nano.c measures the source in full before applying it).
The slice reaches the helper from on_url(), on_header_field() and on_header_value(), which the parser invokes on bytes that http_wait_data() read straight off the socket into the application-supplied recv_buf. A malicious or compromised HTTP server, or an attacker able to answer a plaintext request, therefore controls both the header field and the bytes that follow it in the buffer, and can guarantee that no zero byte appears before the buffer ends, forcing the over-read. The in-tree tests/net/lib/http_client suite reproduces the over-read under CONFIG_ASAN=y on an ordinary GET.
The impact is bounded. The whole helper body is compiled only when the HTTP client log module is explicitly set to Debug (CONFIG_NET_HTTP_LOG_LEVEL_DBG=y, which the global CONFIG_LOG_DEFAULT_LEVEL does not set), so default builds are unaffected. No out-of-bounds write occurs and none of the over-read bytes are emitted into the log, so there is no information disclosure; the consequence is an out-of-bounds read that can fault and panic the device where the buffer abuts an unmapped or MPU/MMU-protected region.
The fix copies exactly the len bytes the parser offered with memcpy() and terminates them, instead of relying on a %s conversion (a %.*s precision would not have sufficed, since cbprintf_nano.c measures the source in full before applying it).
References
- https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/0b2d0c2609cb0a4cd5cd82d2471e... Patch
- https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-pmg7-7q9m-... Vendor Advisory
- https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2026-90588 Third Party Advisory
- https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-90588 Third Party Advisory
- https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/90xxx/CVE-2026-90588... Vendor Advisory
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-90588 Vendor Advisory
- https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr Product
Internet-facing
60 days
Internal
At next upgrade
- Not known to be exploited
- Needs hands-on effort to exploit
- Gives an attacker partial control
Type
CWE-125Out-of-bounds Read
Timeline
Published9 Nov 2026
Updated22 Nov 2026
First seen9 Nov 2026
Sources
CVE-2026-90588 · NVD
CVE-2026-90588 · MITRE
UBUNTU-CVE-2026-90588 · OSV
CVE-2026-90588 · OSV
GHSA-pmg7-7q9m-mx35 · GHSA
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