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9.8

CVE-2026-86219: libauthen-sasl-perl lets attackers replay login

CVE-2026-86219 · published 1 month ago
Summary

The Perl SASL authentication library (libauthen-sasl-perl) does not correctly verify a one‑time token when users log in, so a captured login response can be reused. An attacker who sees a single successful login can replay that information later and gain access to the same account without knowing the password. Update the library to the latest version or apply the vendor's patch to fix the verification logic.

What to do
  • Update debian libauthen-sasl-perl to version 2.2000-2.
  • Update libauthen-sasl-perl to version 2.1600-3.aikido.1.
  • Update rootio-libauthen-sasl-perl to version 2.1600-3.aikido.1.
  • Update bellsoft perl-authen-sasl to version 2.2100-r0.
Affected software
Ecosystem VendorProductAffected versions
Debian:12 debian libauthen-sasl-perl All versions
Ubuntu:14.04:LTS canonical libauthen-sasl-perl All versions
Debian:14 debian libauthen-sasl-perl < 2.2000-2
Fix: upgrade to 2.2000-2
Root:Debian:12 – libauthen-sasl-perl < 2.1600-3.aikido.1
Fix: upgrade to 2.1600-3.aikido.1
Root:Debian:12 – rootio-libauthen-sasl-perl < 2.1600-3.aikido.1
Fix: upgrade to 2.1600-3.aikido.1
Alpaquita:stream bellsoft perl-authen-sasl >= 2.16-r3, < 2.2100-r0
Fix: upgrade to 2.2100-r0
Original advisory text
BELL-CVE-2026-86219
Authen::SASL::Perl::DIGEST_MD5 versions before 2.2100 for Perl accept replayed authentication responses via unverified nonce in server_step. server_start generates a fresh nonce and sends it in the challenge, and nothing later compares that value against the nonce the client returns. server_step derives the expected digest from the client's own parameters, so a response verifies whenever its digest matches the nonce it carries. The count table it also checks is keyed on the client-supplied nonce and starts empty in each new server object, so a captured first response, carrying `nc=00000001`, passes that too. RFC 2831 defines the nonce in the response as the value the server sent in the preceding challenge. An attacker who observes one successful `qop=auth` exchange can replay the captured response against a later session for the same service, host, realm and user, and authenticate as that user without knowing the password.
Fix within
Internet-facing 3 days
Internal 60 days
  • Not known to be exploited
  • Can be exploited automatically
  • Gives an attacker full control
Severity
9.8 Critical
Exploitation
<1% chance of attack within 30 days
Type
CWE-294Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay
Timeline
Published8 Sep 2026
Updated11 Oct 2026
First seen6 Sep 2026
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