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3.5

CVE-2026-77597: iSponsorBlockTV can be tricked to contact any internal URL

CVE-2026-77597 · published 2 days ago
Summary

iSponsorBlockTV looks for nearby smart TVs and automatically follows the address it receives. A person on the same network can send a fake response that points to any internal web service, causing the app to request that service and potentially expose data. Update the software or apply a rule that only allows requests to known TV addresses, and limit the app's network access to trusted devices.

What to do
  • Update isponsorblocktv to version 2.11.0.
Affected software
Ecosystem VendorProductAffected versions
pip – isponsorblocktv <= 2.10.0
Fix: upgrade to 2.11.0
Original advisory text
iSponsorBlockTV: SSRF via Malicious SSDP Response Spoofing in Local Device Discovery
### Summary
iSponsorBlockTV discovers local smart TV devices via SSDP (Simple Service Discovery Protocol). The `LOCATION` URL from SSDP responses is used to fetch device capabilities without URL validation. A local network attacker can craft a malicious SSDP response with a `LOCATION` pointing to any internal HTTP service, causing SSRF when the application fetches device information.

### Details
In `src/iSponsorBlockTV/dial_client.py:92-96`, upon receiving an SSDP M-SEARCH response, the code extracts the `LOCATION` header and makes an HTTP GET request to that URL to retrieve DIAL device description XML. The URL is not validated against expected device IP ranges, expected schemes, or private/internal IP blocklists. Any device on the LAN (or a rogue WiFi access point) can respond to SSDP M-SEARCH queries with a `LOCATION` pointing to internal services.

### Impact
Blind SSRF against internal network services; access to home router admin interfaces, smart home controllers, NAS admin pages, and other local services; potential credential disclosure from fetched responses.
It'd be able to either:
- show a debug log line `- __main__ - DEBUG - Discovered device at <attacker controlled URL>, processing...` (which is normally disabled and won't be shown in the actual configurator since textual doesn't show logs unless running in dev mode and launching a second terminal to inspect log output), and make a single GET request to an "attacker controlled" url which does not leak any information back to iSponsorBlockTV itself and swallows any sort of error (parsing or an invalid response from not being a real DIAL server) (`dial_client.py` L131-L133)
- make single POST request to a partly "attacker controlled" url since it'll always have the suffix `/YouTube` appended (`dial_client.py` L139) , with predefined headers `{"Origin": "https://www.youtube.com","Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",}` (`dial_client.py` L158-L161) and a predefined payload `{"pairingCode": <random 12 digit code>, "theme": "cl"}` which also does not leak any information back to iSponsorBlockTV itself and swallows any sort of error (parsing or an invalid response from not being a real DIAL server with a YouTube app running on it) (`dial_client.py` L162)

### Fix
Validate SSDP `LOCATION` URLs: allow only `http{s}://` scheme, extract the IP address, and verify it matches the SSDP sender's IP address. Reject `LOCATION` values pointing to private IP ranges other than the expected device subnet. (Done on v2.11.0)
Fix within
Internet-facing 60 days
Internal At next upgrade
  • Not known to be exploited
  • Needs hands-on effort to exploit
  • Gives an attacker partial control
Severity
3.5 Low
Exploitation
<1% chance of attack within 30 days
Type
CWE-918Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
Timeline
Published19 Nov 2026
Updated20 Nov 2026
First seen16 Nov 2026
Sources
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