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9.9

CVE-2026-48853: Unauthenticated Code Execution via Erlang Term Deserialization in Elixir gRPC

CVE-2026-48853 · published 9 days ago
Summary

Elixir gRPC versions 0.4.0 to 1.0.0 are vulnerable to unauthenticated code execution and denial of service attacks. An attacker can crash the server by exhausting its atom table or execute arbitrary code on the server. To protect your server, ensure that the GRPC.Codec.Erlpack codec is not registered by default, and only register it explicitly when needed.

What to do
  • Update grpc to version 1.0.0.
Affected software
Ecosystem VendorProductAffected versions
Hex grpc >= 0.4.0, < 1.0.0
Fix: upgrade to 1.0.0
Ubuntu:16.04:LTS canonical grpc All versions
Ubuntu:18.04:LTS canonical grpc All versions
Ubuntu:20.04:LTS canonical grpc All versions
Ubuntu:22.04:LTS canonical grpc All versions
Ubuntu:24.04:LTS canonical grpc All versions
Ubuntu:25.10 canonical grpc All versions
Ubuntu:26.04:LTS canonical grpc All versions
Original advisory text
gRPC Erlang package vulnerable to Remote Code Execution with attacker-controlled gRPC payloads
### Summary

`GRPC.Codec.Erlpack.decode/2` calls `:erlang.binary_to_term/1` directly on the raw gRPC message body without the `:safe` option. Any unauthenticated peer that can reach a gRPC endpoint with `Content-Type: application/grpc+erlpack` can crash the entire BEAM node via atom table exhaustion or, if a decoded fun term flows into a call site that invokes it, achieve remote code execution inside the server process.

### Details

**Root cause** — `lib/grpc/codec/erlpack.ex` implements `decode/2` as a bare `:erlang.binary_to_term(binary)` call with no `:safe` flag, no size limit, and no type validation. This has two independent exploitation paths:

**1. DoS via atom exhaustion** — BEAM atoms are never garbage-collected and the global atom table is bounded (~1,048,576 entries). A crafted payload encoding large numbers of fresh atoms saturates the table and crashes the entire VM, taking down all applications on the node.

**2. RCE via fun materialization** — Without `:safe`, `binary_to_term/1` reconstructs fun and external-fun terms from wire data. If the decoded value reaches any call site that applies it (e.g. `Enum.map`, `Task.async`, direct invocation), attacker-controlled code executes inside the server process.

**Configuration requirement:** `GRPC.Codec.Erlpack` is not registered by default and must be explicitly added to the server's `codecs` option.

### PoC

1. Start a gRPC server with `codecs: [GRPC.Codec.Erlpack]`.
2. Open an HTTP/2 connection to the server.
3. Send a gRPC-framed POST to any RPC path with `Content-Type: application/grpc+erlpack` and a body of `:erlang.term_to_binary(fn -> <malicious_code> end)`.
4. The server's `decode/2` materializes the fun; any downstream call site that invokes the decoded value executes the attacker's code.
5. For DoS only: send payloads encoding fresh atoms in a loop until the atom table is exhausted and the VM crashes.

### Impact

Affects `grpc` ≥ 0.4.0. Any server that explicitly registers `GRPC.Codec.Erlpack` is vulnerable to unauthenticated node-level DoS and potentially RCE.

### References

* Introduction commit: https://github.com/elixir-grpc/grpc/commit/25bcc569fe2cc4478531a6c546c923205fc751c9
* Patch commit: https://github.com/elixir-grpc/grpc/commit/272a97a5ea1b46af1819f14a831fcf35fc91f992
Severity
9.9 Critical
CVSS 4.0: 9.2 (NVD)
CVSS 4.0: 9.9 (OSV)
Exploitation
EPSS <1%
Type
CWE-502Deserialization of Untrusted Data
CWE-770Allocation of Resources Without Limits
Timeline
Published25 Aug 2026
Updated3 Sep 2026
First seen15 Jun 2026
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