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9.8
CVE-2026-15689: Dancer2::Plugin::Auth::Extensible password reset link manipulation via Host header
CVE-2026-15689 · published 19 days ago
Summary
Dancer2::Plugin::Auth::Extensible versions for Perl, through 0.713, contain a security risk where attackers can manipulate password reset links by exploiting the Host header in email links. This could allow an attacker to gain control of an account. To fix this, update to version 0.714 or later.
What to do
The CVE record does not list a fixed version. Check the vendor's site or the advisory links below - a fix may already be released.
Affected software
| Vendor | Product | Affected versions |
|---|---|---|
| abeverley | dancer2::plugin::auth::extensible | <= 0.713 |
Original advisory text
Dancer2::Plugin::Auth::Extensible versions through 0.713 for Perl allow password reset link poisoning via the request Host header in _default_email_password_reset and _default_welcome_send
Dancer2::Plugin::Auth::Extensible versions through 0.713 for Perl allow password reset link poisoning via the request Host header in _default_email_password_reset and _default_welcome_send.
Both default emails emit a link of the form `$base/login/$code`, whose authority comes from the request Host header, or from X-Forwarded-Host under behind_proxy (obtained from Dancer2's request->base function). A POST to /login carrying submit_reset and a username needs no authentication: it stores a fresh reset code against that account and mails the account holder a link to a host of the sender's choosing. The welcome mail takes the same path when the application calls create_user with email_welcome set.
Through 0.711 the handlers read `request->uri_base` and `request->base` directly; Versions 0.712 and later provide an uri_base configuration key that defaults to the untrusted `request->uri_base` when unset.
The default configuration with reset_password_handler enabled and the default message text, a recipient who follows the link hands a working reset code to the sender's host, which is enough to take over the account.
Both default emails emit a link of the form `$base/login/$code`, whose authority comes from the request Host header, or from X-Forwarded-Host under behind_proxy (obtained from Dancer2's request->base function). A POST to /login carrying submit_reset and a username needs no authentication: it stores a fresh reset code against that account and mails the account holder a link to a host of the sender's choosing. The welcome mail takes the same path when the application calls create_user with email_welcome set.
Through 0.711 the handlers read `request->uri_base` and `request->base` directly; Versions 0.712 and later provide an uri_base configuration key that defaults to the untrusted `request->uri_base` when unset.
The default configuration with reset_password_handler enabled and the default message text, a recipient who follows the link hands a working reset code to the sender's host, which is enough to take over the account.
References
- https://metacpan.org/release/ABEVERLEY/Dancer2-Plugin-Auth-Extensible-0.711/sour...
- https://metacpan.org/release/ABEVERLEY/Dancer2-Plugin-Auth-Extensible-0.711/sour...
- https://metacpan.org/release/ABEVERLEY/Dancer2-Plugin-Auth-Extensible-0.712/sour...
- https://metacpan.org/release/ABEVERLEY/Dancer2-Plugin-Auth-Extensible-0.713/sour...
- https://metacpan.org/release/ABEVERLEY/Dancer2-Plugin-Auth-Extensible-0.713/chan... release-notes
- http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/08/15/4
Severity
9.8
Critical
Exploitation
EPSS <1%
Type
CWE-640Weak Password Recovery Mechanism for Forgotten Password
Timeline
Published15 Aug 2026
Updated3 Sep 2026
First seen15 Aug 2026
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