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2.0
CVE-2026-128091: MCUboot with TinyCrypt leaves encryption key in RAM
CVE-2026-128091 · published 6 days ago
Summary
If you use MCUboot built with the TinyCrypt option, the bootloader does not erase the encryption key after it finishes loading the firmware. This means the key can remain in memory and could be read by someone with physical access or by later software, allowing the encrypted firmware to be decrypted. Update to a version that clears the key or switch to a different cryptographic backend to protect the data.
Original advisory text
AES key schedule not cleared by the TinyCrypt AES-CTR backend in MCUboot bootutil
When MCUboot is built with the TinyCrypt crypto backend (MCUBOOT_USE_TINYCRYPT), bootutil_aes_ctr_drop() in boot/bootutil/include/bootutil/crypto/aes_ctr_tinycrypt.h was an empty stub. The AES-CTR context for this backend is the fully expanded AES-128 key schedule (struct tc_aes_key_sched_struct). Generic code relies on this hook to release and clear key state, so with TinyCrypt nothing was cleared. The mbedTLS and PSA backends do free or destroy their key state here.
As a result, boot_state_clear(), which boot_go() calls before handing off to the application, left the image's AES content-encryption key schedule in the static boot_data state. This is the case after an encrypted upgrade in single-image builds, where boot_enc_zeroize() is not called. boot_decrypt_key() likewise left the ECIES-derived key-encryption key schedule on the stack. The affected build uses MCUBOOT_ENC_IMAGES with TinyCrypt, which is the default ECDSA and Ed25519 backend in the Zephyr port.
The first AES-128 round key equals the cipher key, so anyone who can read the leftover bootloader RAM after boot can recover the image content key and decrypt that encrypted image. That includes a physical attacker with debug or RAM access, or code later running on the device. This weakens image-encryption key confidentiality (and so the confidentiality of the encrypted image's plaintext). The device's long-term private decryption key is not exposed, and image authenticity is not affected. The fix wipes the context with bootutil_wipe_memory().
As a result, boot_state_clear(), which boot_go() calls before handing off to the application, left the image's AES content-encryption key schedule in the static boot_data state. This is the case after an encrypted upgrade in single-image builds, where boot_enc_zeroize() is not called. boot_decrypt_key() likewise left the ECIES-derived key-encryption key schedule on the stack. The affected build uses MCUBOOT_ENC_IMAGES with TinyCrypt, which is the default ECDSA and Ed25519 backend in the Zephyr port.
The first AES-128 round key equals the cipher key, so anyone who can read the leftover bootloader RAM after boot can recover the image content key and decrypt that encrypted image. That includes a physical attacker with debug or RAM access, or code later running on the device. This weakens image-encryption key confidentiality (and so the confidentiality of the encrypted image's plaintext). The device's long-term private decryption key is not exposed, and image authenticity is not affected. The fix wipes the context with bootutil_wipe_memory().
References
- https://github.com/mcu-tools/mcuboot/commit/d204aaa3ab40c0b37a52d3b4c433b437f9ad... Patch
- https://github.com/mcu-tools/mcuboot/security/advisories/GHSA-wx3x-935q-6rcf Vendor Advisory
- https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/128xxx/CVE-2026-1280... Vendor Advisory
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-128091 Vendor Advisory
- https://github.com/mcu-tools/mcuboot Product
Internet-facing
60 days
Internal
At next upgrade
- Not known to be exploited
- Needs hands-on effort to exploit
- Gives an attacker partial control
Type
CWE-226Sensitive Information in Resource Not Removed Before Reuse
Timeline
Published13 Nov 2026
Updated19 Nov 2026
First seen13 Nov 2026
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