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2.7

StudioCMS REST Users API Exposes Owner Account Details to Admins

GHSA-xvf4-ch4q-2m24 CVE-2026-32638
Summary

An issue in the StudioCMS REST API allows admins to see sensitive information about owner accounts, including IDs, usernames, display names, and email addresses. This is unexpected because the API is supposed to keep this information private. To fix this, update your StudioCMS software to the latest version, which includes a patch for this issue.

What to do
  • Update GitHub Actions studiocms to version 0.4.4.
Affected software
VendorProductAffected versionsFix available
GitHub Actions studiocms <= 0.4.3 0.4.4
Original title
StudioCMS REST getUsers Exposes Owner Account Records to Admin Tokens
Original description
## Summary

The REST API `getUsers` endpoint in StudioCMS uses the attacker-controlled `rank` query parameter to decide whether owner accounts should be filtered from the result set. As a result, an admin token can request `rank=owner` and receive owner account records, including IDs, usernames, display names, and email addresses, even though the adjacent `getUser` endpoint correctly blocks admins from viewing owner users. This is an authorization inconsistency inside the same user-management surface.

## Details

### Vulnerable Code Path

File: `D:/bugcrowd/studiocms/repo/packages/studiocms/frontend/pages/studiocms_api/_handlers/rest-api/v1/secure.ts`, lines 1605-1647

```ts
.handle(
'getUsers',
Effect.fn(
function* ({ urlParams: { name, rank, username } }) {
if (!restAPIEnabled) {
return yield* new RestAPIError({ error: 'Endpoint not found' });
}
const [sdk, user] = yield* Effect.all([SDKCore, CurrentRestAPIUser]);

if (user.rank !== 'owner' && user.rank !== 'admin') {
return yield* new RestAPIError({ error: 'Unauthorized' });
}

const allUsers = yield* sdk.GET.users.all();
let data = allUsers.map(...);

if (rank !== 'owner') {
data = data.filter((user) => user.rank !== 'owner');
}

if (rank) {
data = data.filter((user) => user.rank === rank);
}

return data;
},
```

The `rank` variable in `if (rank !== 'owner')` is the request query parameter, not the caller's privilege level. An admin can therefore pass `rank=owner`, skip the owner-filtering branch, and then have the second `if (rank)` branch return only owner accounts.

### Adjacent Endpoint Shows Intended Security Boundary

File: `D:/bugcrowd/studiocms/repo/packages/studiocms/frontend/pages/studiocms_api/_handlers/rest-api/v1/secure.ts`, lines 1650-1710

```ts
const existingUserRankIndex = availablePermissionRanks.indexOf(existingUserRank);
const loggedInUserRankIndex = availablePermissionRanks.indexOf(user.rank);

if (loggedInUserRankIndex <= existingUserRankIndex) {
return yield* new RestAPIError({
error: 'Unauthorized to view user with higher rank',
});
}
```

`getUser` correctly blocks an admin from viewing an owner record. `getUsers` bypasses that boundary for bulk enumeration.

### Sensitive Fields Returned

The `getUsers` response includes:

- `id`
- `email`
- `name`
- `username`
- `rank`
- timestamps and profile URL/avatar fields when present

This is enough to enumerate all owner accounts and target them for phishing, social engineering, or follow-on attacks against out-of-band workflows.

## PoC

### HTTP PoC

Use any admin-level REST API token:

```bash
curl -X GET 'http://localhost:4321/studiocms_api/rest/v1/secure/users?rank=owner' \
-H 'Authorization: Bearer <admin-api-token>'
```

Expected behavior:
- owner records should be excluded for admin callers, consistent with `getUser`

Actual behavior:
- the response contains owner user objects, including email addresses and user IDs

### Local Validation of the Exact Handler Logic

I validated the filtering logic locally with the same conditions used by `getUsers` and `getUser`.

Observed output:

```json
{
"admin_getUsers_rank_owner": [
{
"email": "[email protected]",
"id": "owner-1",
"name": "Site Owner",
"rank": "owner",
"username": "owner1"
}
],
"admin_getUser_owner": "Unauthorized to view user with higher rank"
}
```

This demonstrates the authorization mismatch clearly:
- bulk listing with `rank=owner` exposes owner records
- direct access to a single owner record is denied

## Impact

- **Owner Account Enumeration:** Admin tokens can recover owner user IDs, usernames, display names, and email addresses.
- **Authorization Boundary Bypass:** The REST collection endpoint bypasses the stricter per-record rank check already implemented by `getUser`.
- **Chaining Value:** Exposed owner contact data can support phishing, account-targeting, and admin-to-owner pivot attempts in deployments that treat owner identities as higher-trust principals.

## Recommended Fix

Apply rank filtering based on the caller's role, not on the request query parameter, and reuse the same privilege rule as `getUser`.

Example fix:

```ts
const loggedInUserRankIndex = availablePermissionRanks.indexOf(user.rank);

data = data.filter((candidate) => {
const candidateRankIndex = availablePermissionRanks.indexOf(candidate.rank);
return loggedInUserRankIndex > candidateRankIndex;
});

if (rank) {
data = data.filter((candidate) => candidate.rank === rank);
}
```

At minimum, replace:

```ts
if (rank !== 'owner') {
data = data.filter((user) => user.rank !== 'owner');
}
```

with a check tied to `user.rank` rather than the query parameter.
ghsa CVSS3.1 2.7
Vulnerability type
CWE-639 Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key
Published: 16 Mar 2026 · Updated: 16 Mar 2026 · First seen: 16 Mar 2026