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3.7

OpenSSL FIPS Docker images allow private key recovery

published 2 days ago
Summary

The OpenSSL FIPS libraries in certain Docker hardened images do not correctly verify a key during a Diffie‑Hellman exchange. An attacker who supplies a specially crafted key can eventually discover the private key used by the server. Update to the latest OpenSSL FIPS version or apply the vendor’s patch to fix the verification logic.

What to do

The CVE record does not list a fixed version. Check the vendor's site or the advisory links below - a fix may already be released.

Affected software
Ecosystem VendorProductAffected versions
Docker Hardened Images:Alpine:3.23 docker hardened images openssl-provider-fips All versions
Docker Hardened Images:Alpine:3.24 docker hardened images openssl-provider-fips All versions
Docker Hardened Images:Alpine:3.23 docker hardened images openssl All versions
Docker Hardened Images:Alpine:3.24 docker hardened images openssl All versions
Docker Hardened Images:Debian:13 docker hardened images openssl All versions
Original advisory text
Issue summary: When EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer() is called with a DHX (X9.42)
Issue summary: When EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer() is called with a DHX (X9.42)
peer key, the peer key is not properly checked for the subgroup membership.

Impact summary: A malicious peer which presents an X9.42 key carrying the
victim's p and g parameters, a forged q = r (a small prime factor of the
cofactor (p−1)/q_local), and a public value Y of order r can recover the
victim's private key after a small number of key exchange attempts.

When EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer() is called with a DHX (X9.42) peer key, the
subgroup membership check Y^q ≡ 1 (mod p) is performed using the peer's
own q parameter, not the local key's q. The peer's domain parameters are
then matched against the domain parameters of the private key, but the value
of q is not compared.

A malicious peer who presents an X9.42 key carrying the victim's p, g,
a forged q = r (a small prime factor of the cofactor), and a public
value Y of order r passes all checks. The shared secret then takes only
r distinct values, leaking priv mod r. Repeating for each small-prime
factor of the cofactor and combining via CRT recovers the full private
key (Lim–Lee / small-subgroup-confinement attack).

The realistic attack surface is narrow: principally CMP deployments with
long-lived RA/CA DHX keys and bespoke enterprise or government applications
using X9.42 DHX static keys with interactive protocols and therefore this
issue was assigned Low severity.

The FIPS modules in 4.0, 3.6, 3.5, 3.4, and 3.0 are affected by this
issue.
References
Fix within
Internet-facing 14 days
Internal 60 days
  • Not known to be exploited
  • Can be exploited automatically (estimated)
  • Gives an attacker partial control (estimated)
Severity
3.7 Low
Timeline
Published20 Nov 2026
Updated20 Nov 2026
First seen20 Nov 2026
Sources
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