Track vulnerabilities like this one.
Sign up free to get alerted when software you use is affected.
3.7
Docker OpenSSL images allow RSA key decryption attacks
published 2 days ago
Summary
The OpenSSL libraries in Docker’s hardened OpenSSL and OpenSSL‑provider‑FIPS images can be tricked into revealing private RSA keys when they process specially crafted encrypted messages. An attacker who can send such messages and see the program’s error responses could decrypt data or create forged signatures using the victim’s key. Update to a patched OpenSSL version or apply the vendor’s security update to stop the exploit.
What to do
The CVE record does not list a fixed version. Check the vendor's site or the advisory links below - a fix may already be released.
Affected software
| Ecosystem | Vendor | Product | Affected versions |
|---|---|---|---|
| Docker Hardened Images:Alpine:3.23 | docker hardened images | openssl-provider-fips | All versions |
| Docker Hardened Images:Alpine:3.24 | docker hardened images | openssl-provider-fips | All versions |
| Docker Hardened Images:Alpine:3.23 | docker hardened images | openssl | All versions |
| Docker Hardened Images:Alpine:3.24 | docker hardened images | openssl | All versions |
| Docker Hardened Images:Debian:13 | docker hardened images | openssl | All versions |
Original advisory text
Issue summary: The CMS_decrypt and PKCS7_decrypt functions are vulnerable to
Issue summary: The CMS_decrypt and PKCS7_decrypt functions are vulnerable to
Bleichenbacher-style attack when an attacker is able to provide the CMS or
S/MIME messages and observe the error code and/or decryption output.
Impact summary: The Bleichenbacher-style attack allows an attacker to use the
victim's vulnerable application as a way to decrypt or sign messages with the
victim's private RSA key.
The attack is possible in 2 variants.
1. The decryption API (CMS_decrypt(), PKCS7_decrypt()) is used without
providing the recipient certificate. In this case OpenSSL iterates over every
KeyTransRecipientInfo (KTRI) without stopping at the first success.
An attacker who authors a message with two KTRI entries — the first one
wrapping a real CEK under the victim's public key, the second with an
arbitrary probe ciphertext — obtains opportunity to iterate the 2nd KTRI to
get a valid PKCS#1 v1.5 padding if the error code of the application is
available.
That is a Bleichenbacher oracle (Bleichenbacher, CRYPTO '98): an
adaptive-chosen-ciphertext side channel from which the attacker decrypts any
RSA ciphertext to the victim's key or forges any PKCS#1 v1.5 signature under
it.
2. When the decryption API (CMS_decrypt(), PKCS7_decrypt()) is provided with
the recipient certificate, and the recipient is not found, a random
key is substituted.
An attacker who authors a message and is able to compare both error code and
the result of the decryption, can mount a Bleichenbacher oracle.
We are not aware of any applications that provide a remote attacker
an opportunity to mount an attack described in these scenarios. We consider
the existence of such application very unlikely, and for this reason this
CVE has been evaluated as Low severity.
To avoid these attacks, when RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 Key Transport is in use, the
invoked EVP_PKEY_decrypt() will use the implicit rejection mechanism described
in draft-irtf-cfrg-rsa-guidance. In previous OpenSSL releases the implicit
rejection was explicitly disabled.
The implicit rejection mechanism always returns a plaintext value,
the symmetric key. This result is deterministic for the ciphertext and the
private key. The length of the decryption result can happen to match the
length of the key of the symmetric cipher that was used for the content
encryption. When a certificate is not provided, the last RecipientInfo
producing a key that looks valid will be used. It may cause getting garbage
content on decryption. As a proper way to deal with this a recipient
certificate has to be provided to identify the particular RecipientInfo for
decryption.
The FIPS modules in 4.0, 3.6, 3.5, and 3.4 are not affected by this issue, as
CMS and S/MIME processing happens outside the OpenSSL FIPS module boundary.
Bleichenbacher-style attack when an attacker is able to provide the CMS or
S/MIME messages and observe the error code and/or decryption output.
Impact summary: The Bleichenbacher-style attack allows an attacker to use the
victim's vulnerable application as a way to decrypt or sign messages with the
victim's private RSA key.
The attack is possible in 2 variants.
1. The decryption API (CMS_decrypt(), PKCS7_decrypt()) is used without
providing the recipient certificate. In this case OpenSSL iterates over every
KeyTransRecipientInfo (KTRI) without stopping at the first success.
An attacker who authors a message with two KTRI entries — the first one
wrapping a real CEK under the victim's public key, the second with an
arbitrary probe ciphertext — obtains opportunity to iterate the 2nd KTRI to
get a valid PKCS#1 v1.5 padding if the error code of the application is
available.
That is a Bleichenbacher oracle (Bleichenbacher, CRYPTO '98): an
adaptive-chosen-ciphertext side channel from which the attacker decrypts any
RSA ciphertext to the victim's key or forges any PKCS#1 v1.5 signature under
it.
2. When the decryption API (CMS_decrypt(), PKCS7_decrypt()) is provided with
the recipient certificate, and the recipient is not found, a random
key is substituted.
An attacker who authors a message and is able to compare both error code and
the result of the decryption, can mount a Bleichenbacher oracle.
We are not aware of any applications that provide a remote attacker
an opportunity to mount an attack described in these scenarios. We consider
the existence of such application very unlikely, and for this reason this
CVE has been evaluated as Low severity.
To avoid these attacks, when RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 Key Transport is in use, the
invoked EVP_PKEY_decrypt() will use the implicit rejection mechanism described
in draft-irtf-cfrg-rsa-guidance. In previous OpenSSL releases the implicit
rejection was explicitly disabled.
The implicit rejection mechanism always returns a plaintext value,
the symmetric key. This result is deterministic for the ciphertext and the
private key. The length of the decryption result can happen to match the
length of the key of the symmetric cipher that was used for the content
encryption. When a certificate is not provided, the last RecipientInfo
producing a key that looks valid will be used. It may cause getting garbage
content on decryption. As a proper way to deal with this a recipient
certificate has to be provided to identify the particular RecipientInfo for
decryption.
The FIPS modules in 4.0, 3.6, 3.5, and 3.4 are not affected by this issue, as
CMS and S/MIME processing happens outside the OpenSSL FIPS module boundary.
References
- https://scout.docker.com/v/DHI-vldu-hzfh-mwks-2rmp Vendor Advisory
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42768 Vendor Advisory
- https://openssl-library.org/news/secadv/20260609.txt Vendor Advisory
- https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/f04b377be3d821741c86d1f4bf84dee09f3d5c... Patch
- https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/dd68364107a58841c0a2546812518b65d3a23a... Patch
- https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/bbb151a83041705d9d001ed2f9c12f5523e1b5... Patch
- https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/a2ca7b2d73e0ffc1eae183fe6e1741dac767cb... Patch
- https://errata.almalinux.org/9/ALSA-2026-25239.html Vendor Advisory
- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:25239 Vendor Advisory
- https://security.alpinelinux.org/vuln/CVE-2026-42768 Vendor Advisory
- https://alas.aws.amazon.com/AL2023/ALAS-2026-1853.html Vendor Advisory
- http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2026-9076 Vendor Advisory
- http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2026-7383 Vendor Advisory
- http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2026-45447 Vendor Advisory
- http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2026-45446 Vendor Advisory
- http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2026-45445 Vendor Advisory
- http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2026-42770 Vendor Advisory
- http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2026-42769 Vendor Advisory
- http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2026-42768 Vendor Advisory
- http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2026-42767 Vendor Advisory
- http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2026-42766 Vendor Advisory
- http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2026-42764 Vendor Advisory
- http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2026-34183 Vendor Advisory
- http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2026-34182 Vendor Advisory
- http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2026-34181 Vendor Advisory
- http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2026-34180 Vendor Advisory
- https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-42768 Vendor Advisory
- https://linux.oracle.com/cve/ELSA-2026-25237.html Vendor Advisory
- https://linux.oracle.com/errata/ELSA-2026-25237.html Vendor Advisory
- https://linux.oracle.com/cve/ELSA-2026-25239.html Vendor Advisory
- https://linux.oracle.com/errata/ELSA-2026-25239.html Vendor Advisory
- https://linux.oracle.com/cve/ELSA-2026-50379.html Vendor Advisory
- https://linux.oracle.com/errata/ELSA-2026-50379.html Vendor Advisory
- https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-42768 Vendor Advisory
- https://errata.rockylinux.org/RLSA-2026:25237 Vendor Advisory
- https://errata.rockylinux.org/RLSA-2026:25239 Vendor Advisory
- https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2026-42768 Vendor Advisory
- http://people.ubuntu.com/~ubuntu-security/cve/CVE-2026-42768 Vendor Advisory
Internet-facing
14 days
Internal
60 days
- Not known to be exploited
- Can be exploited automatically (estimated)
- Gives an attacker partial control (estimated)
Timeline
Published20 Nov 2026
Updated20 Nov 2026
First seen20 Nov 2026
Sources
DHI-vldu-hzfh-mwks-2rmp · OSV
Track software like this
Free during beta