### Summary

There is a security issue in Gogs where deleting a release can fail if a user-controlled tag name is passed to Git without the right separator, allowing Git option injection and therefore interfering with the process.

### Affected Component

- internal/database/release.go
`process.ExecDir(..., "git", "tag", "-d", rel.TagName)`

### Details

`rel.TagName` is used as a CLI argument to `git tag -d` without `--` or `--end-of-options`.
If the tag name begins with `-`, Git parses it as a flag.

The prior mitigation is incomplete. There is path sanitization in place during creation:

- internal/database/release.go
`r.TagName = strings.TrimLeft(r.TagName, "-")`

But it only covers one creation path and does not reliably protect tag deletions, such as tags added through `git push` or ref updates.

**Exploit Conditions**
1. An attacker can add a tag name that starts with a dash into the repository.
2. A user with permission to delete releases triggers it through the web UI or API.

### Recommended Fix

1. Add end-of-options in release deletion:
- `git tag -d -- <tagName>`
2. It is better to use the safe git-module deletion helper since it handles options properly.
3. All Git commands should be audited for user input, ensuring that the end-of-options separator is always used.

### Impact
- Option injection into `git tag -d`
- Tag/release deletion can fail or behave unexpectedly
- Operational denial of service in release cleanup workflows
- Potential release metadata inconsistency

CWE-88