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9.9
OpenClaw: Local User Can Forge Identity Headers
GHSA-rggc-m335-3wvj
Summary
A local user on the same network as an OpenClaw server could potentially trick the system into thinking they are a trusted user. This could allow them to access sensitive features or information. To fix this, update to version 2026.5.18 or configure the server to block direct access from the same network.
What to do
- Update GitHub Actions openclaw to version 2026.5.18.
Affected software
| Ecosystem | Vendor | Product | Affected versions |
|---|---|---|---|
| npm | GitHub Actions | openclaw |
< 2026.5.18 Fix: upgrade to 2026.5.18
|
Original title
OpenClaw: Same-host trusted-proxy deployments could accept local forged identity headers
Original description
### Summary
Same-host trusted-proxy deployments could accept local forged identity headers. In affected versions, a local same-host caller that can reach the proxy-facing Gateway port could supply identity headers normally reserved for the trusted proxy.
This advisory is scoped to the named feature and configuration. It does not change OpenClaw's trusted-operator model: authenticated Gateway operators, installed plugins, and intentional local execution surfaces remain trusted unless a separate policy, approval, allowlist, sandbox, or auth boundary is crossed.
### Impact
When the affected feature is enabled and reachable, this could receive operator identity associated with the forged headers. Practical impact depends on the operator's configuration and whether lower-trust input can reach that path.
### Patched Versions
The first stable patched version is `2026.5.18`.
### Mitigations
bind trusted-proxy ingress behind the actual proxy and firewall direct same-host access. As general hardening, keep channel and tool allowlists narrow, avoid sharing one Gateway between mutually untrusted users, and disable the affected feature when it is not needed.
Same-host trusted-proxy deployments could accept local forged identity headers. In affected versions, a local same-host caller that can reach the proxy-facing Gateway port could supply identity headers normally reserved for the trusted proxy.
This advisory is scoped to the named feature and configuration. It does not change OpenClaw's trusted-operator model: authenticated Gateway operators, installed plugins, and intentional local execution surfaces remain trusted unless a separate policy, approval, allowlist, sandbox, or auth boundary is crossed.
### Impact
When the affected feature is enabled and reachable, this could receive operator identity associated with the forged headers. Practical impact depends on the operator's configuration and whether lower-trust input can reach that path.
### Patched Versions
The first stable patched version is `2026.5.18`.
### Mitigations
bind trusted-proxy ingress behind the actual proxy and firewall direct same-host access. As general hardening, keep channel and tool allowlists narrow, avoid sharing one Gateway between mutually untrusted users, and disable the affected feature when it is not needed.
osv CVSS4.0
9.9
Vulnerability type
CWE-269
Improper Privilege Management
CWE-284
Improper Access Control
CWE-287
Improper Authentication
CWE-290
CWE-863
Incorrect Authorization
Published: 2 Jul 2026 · Updated: 2 Jul 2026 · First seen: 2 Jul 2026