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7.5
SeaweedFS COSI driver allows cross‑bucket access via '..' in URL
published 8 days ago
Summary
The SeaweedFS COSI driver images build their web routers without cleaning the path, so a request that includes ".." can move out of the requested bucket and reach another bucket's data. This lets users read or write files in buckets they shouldn't have access to, even if authentication is enabled. Update to a version that validates path components or disables the unsafe routing setting.
What to do
The CVE record does not list a fixed version. Check the vendor's site or the advisory links below - a fix may already be released.
Affected software
| Ecosystem | Vendor | Product | Affected versions |
|---|---|---|---|
| Docker Hardened Images:Alpine:3.24 | docker hardened images | seaweedfs-cosi-driver-dev | All versions |
| Docker Hardened Images:Alpine:3.24 | docker hardened images | seaweedfs-cosi-driver-fips-dev | All versions |
| Docker Hardened Images:Alpine:3.24 | docker hardened images | seaweedfs-cosi-driver-fips | All versions |
| Docker Hardened Images:Alpine:3.24 | docker hardened images | seaweedfs-cosi-driver | All versions |
Original advisory text
## Summary
## Summary
The S3 API gateway and the Iceberg REST catalog gateway construct their routers with `mux.NewRouter().SkipClean(true)`. With path cleaning disabled, a `..` segment inside the URL survives routing, so a request such as:
```
GET /bucket-A/../evil-bucket/key
```
is matched as `bucket=bucket-A`, `object=../evil-bucket/key`. The captured object key is then joined into a filer path with `util.JoinPath` (S3) / `path.Join` (Iceberg), which collapse the `..` server-side, so the actual read or write lands in `evil-bucket`.
The captured path variables were never validated for traversal segments before reaching the handlers, so bucket isolation depended on downstream checks rather than on the path itself.
## Impact
- **With authentication disabled** (`enableAuth=false`): direct cross-bucket read and write. An object key containing `..` resolves to and operates on a different bucket than the one named in the request path.
- **With authentication enabled** (`enableAuth=true`): an authorization confused-deputy. IAM evaluates the policy against the mux `{bucket}` variable (`bucket-A`) in `iam.authRequestWithAuthType`, while the I/O is performed against the traversed target (`evil-bucket`). A principal authorized for one bucket can therefore reach objects in another bucket it has no grant for. This breaks tenant isolation.
The same class of traversal applies to the Iceberg REST catalog's `{prefix}`, `{namespace}`, and `{table}` path variables.
`%2e%2e`-encoded and `..\` (backslash) variants are equivalent, because gorilla/mux URL-decodes captured variables and `NormalizeObjectKey` folds `\` to `/` before the path is used.
## Affected components
- S3 API gateway (`weed s3`, and the S3 endpoint embedded in `weed server`)
- Iceberg REST catalog gateway
## Affected versions
All releases prior to **4.30**.
## Patched version
**4.30** and later.
## Proof of concept
With a bucket `evil-bucket` containing `secret.txt`, and a caller that only has (or needs no) access to `bucket-A`:
```
GET /bucket-A/../evil-bucket/secret.txt HTTP/1.1
Host: <gateway>
```
The response returns the contents of `evil-bucket/secret.txt`. The encoded form `GET /bucket-A/%2e%2e/evil-bucket/secret.txt` behaves identically.
## Remediation
Upgrade to SeaweedFS **4.30** or later. The fix adds a validation middleware to both gateway routers that rejects any captured path variable containing a `.` or `..` segment, a NUL byte, an embedded slash/backslash in single-segment slots, or an empty captured value, before any handler runs.
## Workarounds
For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, place a reverse proxy in front of the gateway that normalizes the request path and rejects requests whose path contains `..`, `%2e%2e`, or backslash sequences. Note that disabling auth removes the only remaining barrier, so do not rely on `enableAuth=false` deployments being protected by anything.
## Resources
- Fix: https://github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/pull/9687 (commit `dd1b428`)
## Credits
Reported responsibly by **Denis Abashkin** ([@dadbravo](https://github.com/dadbravo)).
The S3 API gateway and the Iceberg REST catalog gateway construct their routers with `mux.NewRouter().SkipClean(true)`. With path cleaning disabled, a `..` segment inside the URL survives routing, so a request such as:
```
GET /bucket-A/../evil-bucket/key
```
is matched as `bucket=bucket-A`, `object=../evil-bucket/key`. The captured object key is then joined into a filer path with `util.JoinPath` (S3) / `path.Join` (Iceberg), which collapse the `..` server-side, so the actual read or write lands in `evil-bucket`.
The captured path variables were never validated for traversal segments before reaching the handlers, so bucket isolation depended on downstream checks rather than on the path itself.
## Impact
- **With authentication disabled** (`enableAuth=false`): direct cross-bucket read and write. An object key containing `..` resolves to and operates on a different bucket than the one named in the request path.
- **With authentication enabled** (`enableAuth=true`): an authorization confused-deputy. IAM evaluates the policy against the mux `{bucket}` variable (`bucket-A`) in `iam.authRequestWithAuthType`, while the I/O is performed against the traversed target (`evil-bucket`). A principal authorized for one bucket can therefore reach objects in another bucket it has no grant for. This breaks tenant isolation.
The same class of traversal applies to the Iceberg REST catalog's `{prefix}`, `{namespace}`, and `{table}` path variables.
`%2e%2e`-encoded and `..\` (backslash) variants are equivalent, because gorilla/mux URL-decodes captured variables and `NormalizeObjectKey` folds `\` to `/` before the path is used.
## Affected components
- S3 API gateway (`weed s3`, and the S3 endpoint embedded in `weed server`)
- Iceberg REST catalog gateway
## Affected versions
All releases prior to **4.30**.
## Patched version
**4.30** and later.
## Proof of concept
With a bucket `evil-bucket` containing `secret.txt`, and a caller that only has (or needs no) access to `bucket-A`:
```
GET /bucket-A/../evil-bucket/secret.txt HTTP/1.1
Host: <gateway>
```
The response returns the contents of `evil-bucket/secret.txt`. The encoded form `GET /bucket-A/%2e%2e/evil-bucket/secret.txt` behaves identically.
## Remediation
Upgrade to SeaweedFS **4.30** or later. The fix adds a validation middleware to both gateway routers that rejects any captured path variable containing a `.` or `..` segment, a NUL byte, an embedded slash/backslash in single-segment slots, or an empty captured value, before any handler runs.
## Workarounds
For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, place a reverse proxy in front of the gateway that normalizes the request path and rejects requests whose path contains `..`, `%2e%2e`, or backslash sequences. Note that disabling auth removes the only remaining barrier, so do not rely on `enableAuth=false` deployments being protected by anything.
## Resources
- Fix: https://github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/pull/9687 (commit `dd1b428`)
## Credits
Reported responsibly by **Denis Abashkin** ([@dadbravo](https://github.com/dadbravo)).
References
- https://scout.docker.com/v/DHI-tkxr-67bp-qz3o-eaw7 Vendor Advisory
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-w62w-66v9-vvgv Vendor Advisory
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54917 Vendor Advisory
- https://github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/security/advisories/GHSA-w62w-66v9-vvgv Vendor Advisory
- https://github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/pull/9687 Patch
- https://github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/commit/dd1b4287899eed3dfd73c2f3b1de001996... Patch
- https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2026-6221 Vendor Advisory
Internet-facing
14 days
Internal
60 days
- Not known to be exploited
- Can be exploited automatically (estimated)
- Gives an attacker partial control (estimated)
Timeline
Published13 Nov 2026
Updated16 Nov 2026
First seen16 Nov 2026
Sources
DHI-tkxr-67bp-qz3o-eaw7 · OSV
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