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1.0

setuptools can write __init__.py to unexpected location on Windows

published 29 days ago
Summary

When installing certain Python packages on Windows, a malicious package can place a file named __init__.py outside the intended folder. This happens because the installer trusts a text file inside the package that can contain a full Windows path. Use the latest version of setuptools or apply the provided patch to prevent the installer from accepting absolute paths in that file.

What to do
  • Update python packaging authority setuptools to version 84.1.0.
Affected software
Ecosystem VendorProductAffected versions
pip python packaging authority setuptools >= 38.2.2, < 84.1.0
Fix: upgrade to 84.1.0
Original advisory text
setuptools: Windows path escape via namespace_packages.txt during legacy wheel installation Description
### Summary

On Windows, attacker-controlled content in a wheel's
`.dist-info/namespace_packages.txt` can cause setuptools' legacy wheel
installation path to create an `__init__.py` outside the requested
`destination_eggdir`.

The attacker can influence the destination path, but not the contents of
the created file.

### Details

Tested setuptools commit:

`6ead555c5fb29bc57fe6105b1bffc163f56fd558`

Relevant source:

`setuptools/wheel.py`

SHA-256:

`359b7e0d5dd8c3135653abe08a8ed5dc0352eadfd7df22cb5e2b5303b7c3cafd`

The relevant call path is:

`Wheel(wheel_path).install_as_egg(destination)`
→ `_install_as_egg`
→ `_convert_metadata`
→ `_fix_namespace_packages`

A wheel can provide attacker-controlled content in:

`<distribution>.dist-info/namespace_packages.txt`

The namespace value is eventually used approximately as:

```python
mod_dir = os.path.join(destination_eggdir, *mod.split('.'))
mod_init = os.path.join(mod_dir, '__init__.py')

If mod is a Windows drive-qualified absolute path containing no dots,
mod.split('.') preserves it as a single component.
On Windows, os.path.join(destination_eggdir, absolute_component) discards
the original base directory and resolves to the attacker-supplied absolute
path.
The existing wheel filename and ZIP traversal checks do not validate this
metadata value before it is subsequently interpreted as a filesystem path.

```markdown
### PoC

The reproduction was performed entirely inside a disposable temporary
directory.

Layout:

```text
sandbox/
destination/
outside/
input/
canary.txt
```

A synthetic wheel was created containing:

`demo_pkg-1.0.dist-info/namespace_packages.txt`

whose content was the absolute path of:

`sandbox\outside`

The real acquired setuptools implementation was then invoked:

```python
setuptools.wheel.Wheel(synthetic_wheel).install_as_egg(
sandbox_destination
)
```

The operation completed without exception.

Expected metadata was created under:

`sandbox\destination\EGG-INFO`

but setuptools also created:

`sandbox\outside\__init__.py`

The file did not exist before execution.

Its contents were:

```python
__import__('pkg_resources').declare_namespace(__name__)
```

The unrelated canary remained byte-identical.

The sandbox was deleted after recording the evidence.
```


### Impact

A crafted wheel can cause setuptools to create a fixed-content
`__init__.py` outside the intended installation directory at a
filesystem path influenced by the wheel, with the permissions of the
process performing the installation.

The demonstrated reproduction required the target parent directory to
already exist.
Fix within
Internet-facing 60 days
Internal At next upgrade
  • Not known to be exploited
  • Needs hands-on effort to exploit (estimated)
  • Gives an attacker partial control (estimated)
Severity
1.0 Low
Type
CWE-22Path Traversal
Timeline
Published23 Oct 2026
Updated23 Oct 2026
First seen23 Oct 2026
Sources
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