## Summary

Discovery beacons (Bonjour/mDNS and DNS-SD) include TXT records such as `lanHost`, `tailnetDns`, `gatewayPort`, and `gatewayTlsSha256`. TXT records are unauthenticated.

Prior to the fix, some clients treated TXT values as authoritative routing/pinning inputs:

- iOS and macOS: used TXT-provided host hints (`lanHost`/`tailnetDns`) and ports (`gatewayPort`) to build the connection URL.
- iOS and Android: allowed the discovery-provided TLS fingerprint (`gatewayTlsSha256`) to override a previously stored TLS pin.

On a shared/untrusted LAN, an attacker could advertise a rogue `_openclaw-gw._tcp` service. This could cause a client to connect to an attacker-controlled endpoint and/or accept an attacker certificate, potentially exfiltrating Gateway credentials (`auth.token` / `auth.password`) during connection.

## Distribution / Exposure

The iOS and Android apps are currently alpha/not broadly shipped (no public App Store / Play Store release). Practical impact is primarily limited to developers/testers running those builds, plus any other shipped clients relying on discovery on a shared/untrusted LAN.

CVSS can still be used for the technical (base) severity of the bug; limited distribution primarily affects environmental risk.

## Affected Packages / Versions

- Package: `openclaw` (npm)
- Affected: `<= 2026.2.13` (latest published on npm as of 2026-02-14)
- Patched: planned for `>= 2026.2.14` (not yet published at time of writing)

## Fix

- Clients now prefer the resolved service endpoint (SRV + A/AAAA) over TXT-provided routing hints.
- Discovery-provided fingerprints no longer override stored TLS pins.
- iOS/Android: first-time TLS pins require explicit user confirmation (fingerprint shown; no silent TOFU).
- iOS/Android: discovery-based direct connects are TLS-only.
- Android: hostname verification is no longer globally disabled (only bypassed when pinning).

## Fix Commit(s)

- d583782ee322a6faa1fe87ae52455e0d349de586

## Credits

Thanks @simecek for reporting.

CWE-345