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3.7

Docker hardened images may skip safety check in templates

published 8 days ago
Summary

The affected Docker images use a template function that can bypass a security check, allowing raw data to be read without proper validation. This only happens when the compatibility mode is turned on. Disable the {compat: true} setting in those images to prevent the issue.

What to do

The CVE record does not list a fixed version. Check the vendor's site or the advisory links below - a fix may already be released.

Affected software
Ecosystem VendorProductAffected versions
Docker Hardened Images:Alpine:3.24 docker hardened images jupyterhub-k8s-singleuser-sample-fips All versions
Docker Hardened Images:Debian:13 docker hardened images datahub-ingestion All versions
Docker Hardened Images:Debian:13 docker hardened images jupyterhub-k8s-singleuser-sample-fips All versions
Docker Hardened Images:Debian:13 docker hardened images jupyterhub-k8s-singleuser-sample All versions
Docker Hardened Images:Debian:13 docker hardened images superset All versions
Original advisory text
## Summary
## Summary

In `lib/handlebars/runtime.js`, the `container.lookup()` function uses `container.lookupProperty()` as a gate check to enforce prototype-access controls, but then discards the validated result and performs a second, unguarded property access (`depths[i][name]`). This Time-of-Check Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) pattern means the security check and the actual read are decoupled, and the raw access bypasses any sanitization that `lookupProperty` may perform.

Only relevant when the **compat** compile option is enabled (`{compat: true}`), which activates `depthedLookup` in `lib/handlebars/compiler/javascript-compiler.js`.

## Description

The vulnerable code in `lib/handlebars/runtime.js` (lines 137–144):

```javascript
lookup: function (depths, name) {
const len = depths.length;
for (let i = 0; i < len; i++) {
let result = depths[i] && container.lookupProperty(depths[i], name);
if (result != null) {
return depths[i][name]; // BUG: should be `return result;`
}
}
},
```

`container.lookupProperty()` (lines 119–136) enforces `hasOwnProperty` checks and `resultIsAllowed()` prototype-access controls. However, `container.lookup()` only uses `lookupProperty` as a boolean gate — if the gate passes (`result != null`), it then performs an independent, raw `depths[i][name]` access that circumvents any transformation or wrapped value that `lookupProperty` may have returned.

## Workarounds

- Avoid enabling `{ compat: true }` when rendering templates that include untrusted data.
- Ensure context data objects are plain JSON (no Proxies, no getter-based accessor properties).
Fix within
Internet-facing 14 days
Internal 60 days
  • Not known to be exploited
  • Can be exploited automatically (estimated)
  • Gives an attacker partial control (estimated)
Severity
3.7 Low
Timeline
Published14 Nov 2026
Updated16 Nov 2026
First seen16 Nov 2026
Sources
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